The EVP (email verification protocol) helps users create, access and recover accounts by providing cryptographic proof that they own an email address, rather than having to manually verify email addresses with magic links. https://github.com/dickhardt/email-verification-protocol
Verifying email addresses on the web today involves receiving magic link and proving that you have access to the email inbox. This is cumbersome for users and inefficient for developers: emails can take a while to arrive, can get into SPAM folders and users have to switch applications to verify them.
None
Does this intent deprecate or change behavior of existing APIs, such that it has potentially high risk for Android WebView-based applications?
None
None
No milestones specified
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to blink-dev+...@chromium.org .
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/68bb77c8.050a0220.257801.0191.GAE%40google.com .
That seems to be a major hurdle for this, unless every mail provider in the world sets up an email verification service, sites will have to maintain two code paths for email verification.
it also requires the user to be logged in to some kind of webmail service for their email in the browser they are using, with authentication handled by cookies, and for the verification site to be the same domain/site as the webmail so that those cookies are sent. It seems to require a lot of things to be just right to be as smooth as envisioned.
(The spec could use more characters by the way, not everything needs to be 3 letters long, kty, alg, typ, iat, cnf, jwp, iss, aud, evp, ...)
/Daniel
There's been some discussion recently on chromium-dev@ about a new phone number verification mechanism using flash calls.
I'm curious if there's interest in expanding this work on email verification to include both email addresses and phone numbers.
Unrelatedly, as someone who hosts their own email I'm curious if there are reference implementations available for the email provider side of this system.
I'd love to play around with this API and want to be sure it's not limited to users of the major email providers.
That seems to be a major hurdle for this, unless every mail provider in the world sets up an email verification service
, sites will have to maintain two code paths for email verification.
it also requires the user to be logged in to some kind of webmail service for their email in the browser they are using, with authentication handled by cookies, and for the verification site to be the same domain/site as the webmail so that those cookies are sent. It seems to require a lot of things to be just right to be as smooth as envisioned.
(The spec could use more characters by the way, not everything needs to be 3 letters long, kty, alg, typ, iat, cnf, jwp, iss, aud, evp, ...)
It would be nice if this could support the case where the user is not logged into their email provider (i.e. it could open an authentication page if no cookie is present). This matters for email providers that don't use a web-based client. For example, since I access my email with Thunderbird there's no cookie in my browser related to my email provider.
I was thinking about that when reading the explainer, and I can see why not doing it initially. If you are signing up for an account at www.possibly-malicious.site it could be scary to have something asking for your email password. Such questions could also make it easier for www.really-malicious.site to trick a user to hand over their email password to the wrong party.
It is certainly possible, but it would also add complexity and risks.
/Daniel
I was thinking about that when reading the explainer, and I can see why not doing it initially. If you are signing up for an account at www.possibly-malicious.site it could be scary to have something asking for your email password. Such questions could also make it easier for www.really-malicious.site to trick a user to hand over their email password to the wrong party.
It is certainly possible, but it would also add complexity and risks.