Security, Privacy and Abuse Prevention
The Internet and the World Wide Web have brought many changes that provide huge benefits, in particular by giving people easy access to information that was previously unavailable, or simply hard to find. Unfortunately, these changes have raised many new challenges in the security of computer systems and the protection of information against unauthorized access and abusive usage. At Google, our primary focus is the user, and his/her safety. We have people working on nearly every aspect of security, privacy, and anti-abuse including access control and information security, networking, operating systems, language design, cryptography, fraud detection and prevention, spam and abuse detection, denial of service, anonymity, privacy-preserving systems, disclosure controls, as well as user interfaces and other human-centered aspects of security and privacy. Our security and privacy efforts cover a broad range of systems including mobile, cloud, distributed, sensors and embedded systems, and large-scale machine learning.
Recent Publications
"It didn’t feel right but I needed a job so desperately": Understanding People's Emotions & Help Needs During Financial Scams
G. Jake Chanenson
Tara Matthews
Jessica McClearn
Sarah Meiklejohn
Mia Hassoun
2026
Preview abstract
Online financial scams represent a long-standing and serious threat for which people seek help. We present a study to understand people’s in situ motivations for engaging with scams and the help needs they express before, during, and after encountering a scam. We identify the main emotions scammers exploited (e.g., fear, hope) and characterize how they did so. We examine factors—such as financial insecurity and legal precarity—which elevate people’s risk of engaging with specific scams and experiencing harm. We indicate when people sought help and describe their help-seeking needs and emotions at different stages of the scam. We discuss how these needs could be met through the design of contextually-specific prevention, diagnostic, mitigation, and recovery interventions.
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Approximate vs Precise: An experiment in what impacts user choice when apps request location access
Extended Abstracts of the 2026 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI EA ’26), April 13–17, 2026, Barcelona, Spain (2026)
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User location data is highly sensitive, yet commonly requested by mobile apps for both core functionality and monetization. To improve user privacy, the major mobile platforms, Android and iOS, made changes so that when apps request precise location access, users can choose to share only their approximate location. However, the platforms have diverging interfaces: Android offers a side-by-side choice and iOS offers a corner toggle. This study evaluates which factors impact users’ choices when apps request location access via a randomized controlled experiment with 2579 US Android users. We tested the impact of app type, whether a reason for the request was provided, and the quality and content of the reason, including monetization. We do not find the reasons have an effect. Instead, we find users’ choices are impacted by app type and user demographics. We find that when users are given a side-by-side choice to allow approximate versus precise location access, they make reasonable choices. Of users who allowed access, the vast majority (90.7%) chose precise for a rideshare app versus the majority (71.3%) chose approximate for a local news app. Concerningly, the majority also allowed location access to a wallpaper app, and older users were significantly more likely to allow apps precise location access. We conclude by discussing implications for app platforms and future work.
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Uncovering Relationships between Android Developers, User Privacy, and Developer Willingness to Reduce Fingerprinting Risks
Proceedings of the 2026 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’26) (2026)
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The major mobile platforms, Android and iOS, have introduced changes that restrict user tracking to improve user privacy, yet apps continue to covertly track users via device fingerprinting. We study the opportunity to improve this dynamic with a case study on mobile fingerprinting that evaluates developers’ perceptions of how well platforms protect user privacy and how developers perceive platform privacy interventions. Specifically, we study developers’ willingness to make changes to protect users from fingerprinting and how developers consider trade-offs between user privacy and developer effort. We do this via a survey of 246 Android developers, presented with a hypothetical Android change that protects users from fingerprinting at the cost of additional developer effort.
We find developers overwhelmingly (89%) support this change, even when they anticipate significant effort, yet prefer the change be optional versus required. Surprisingly, developers who use fingerprinting are six times more likely to support the change, despite being most impacted by it. We also find developers are most concerned about compliance and enforcement. In addition, our results show that while most rank iOS above Android for protecting user privacy, this distinction significantly reduces among developers very familiar with fingerprinting. Thus there is an important opportunity for platforms and developers to collaboratively build privacy protections, and we present actionable ways platforms can facilitate this.
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Modern user interfaces are complex composites, with elements originating from various sources, such as the operating system, apps, a web browser, or websites. Many security and privacy models implicitly depend on users correctly identifying an element's source, a concept we term ''surface attribution.'' Through two large-scale vignette-based surveys (N=4,400 and N=3,057), we present the first empirical measurement of this ability.
We find that users struggle, correctly attributing UI source only 55% of the time on desktop and 53% on mobile. Familiarity and strong brand cues significantly improve accuracy, whereas UI positioning, a long-held security design concept especially for browsers, has minimal impact. Furthermore, simply adding a ''Security & Privacy'' brand cue to Android permission prompts failed to improve attribution. These findings demonstrate a fundamental gap in users' mental models, indicating that relying on them to distinguish trusted UI is a fragile security paradigm.
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Who is At-Risk? Surveying the Prevalence of Risk Factors and Tech-Facilitated Attacks in the United States
Sharon Heung
Claire Weizenegger
Mo Houtti
Tara Matthews
Ashley Walker
2026
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A growing body of qualitative research has identified contextual risk factors that elevate people’s chances of experiencing digital-safety attacks. However, the lack of quantitative data on the population level distribution of these risk factors prevents policymakers and tech companies from developing targeted, evidence-based interventions to improve digital safety. To address this gap, we surveyed 5,001 adults in the United States to analyze: (1) the frequency of and relationship between digital-safety attacks (e.g., scams, harassment, account hacking), and (2) how these attacks align with 10 contextual risk factors. Nearly half of our respondents identify as resource constrained, which significantly correlates with higher likelihood of experiencing four common attacks. We also present qualitative insights to expand our understanding of the factors beyond the existing literature (e.g., “prominence” included high-visibility roles in local communities). This study provides the first large-scale quantitative analysis correlating digital-safety attacks with contextual risk factors and demographics.
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Permission Rationales in the Web Ecosystem: An Exploration of Rationale Text and Design Patterns
Yusra Elbitar
Soheil Khodayari
Gianluca De Stefano
Balazs Engedy
Giancarlo Pellegrino
Sven Bugiel
CHI 2025, ACM
Preview abstract
Modern web applications rely on features like camera and geolocation for personalized experiences, requiring user permission via browser prompts. To explain these requests, applications provide rationales—contextual information on why permissions are needed. Despite their importance, little is known about how rationales appear on the web or their influence on user decisions.
This paper presents the first large-scale study of how the web ecosystem handles permission rationales, covering three areas: (i) identifying webpages that use permissions, (ii) detecting and classifying permission rationales, and (iii) analyzing their attributes to understand their impact on user decisions. We examined over 770K webpages from Chrome telemetry, finding 3.6K unique rationale texts and 749 rationale UIs across 85K pages. We extracted key rationale attributes and assessed their effect on user behavior by cross-referencing them with Chrome telemetry data. Our findings reveal nine key insights, providing the first evidence of how different rationales affect user decisions.
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