
マイケル・グリーン

a report of the csis japan chair
anchoring stability in asia
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Authors
Richard L. Armitage スキンヘッドのアミテージ
Joseph S. Nye (ブログ注;CFR理事であり、アミテージよりはるかに格上)
(ブログ注; 2008 年 12 月 、東京都内で 日本 の 民主党 幹部と会談を行い 、「オバマ次期政権下で(日本の)民主党が安全保障政策で インド洋での給油活動 をやめ、 日米地位協定 などの見直しに動いたら 反米 と受け止める」と発言を行った
カーター 政権で 国務副次官 ( Deputy to the Under Secretary of State 、 1977 年 - 1979 年 )、 クリントン 政権では 国家情報会議 議長( 1993 年 -1994 年)、 国防次官補 (国際安全保障担当、 1994 年 - 1995 年 )として政策決定に携わる。
1995 年 から 2004 年 7 月 まで ハーバード大学 の行政・政治学大学院である ケネディスクール の学長を務めた。)
August 2012
About CSIS—50th Anniversary Year
contents
Study Group Participants iv
Study Group Signatures v
Introduction 1
Energy Security ( Nuclear Energy ) 2
Economics and Trade ( TPP ) 6
Relations with Neighbors 7
Toward a New Security Strategy 11
Conclusion 15
Recommendations 16
About the Authors 19
Further restarts depend on safety checks and local approval . The cautious resumption 再開 of nuclear generation under such conditions is the right and responsible step in our view.
Two additional areas for potential increased alliance defense cooperation are in minesweeping in the Persian Gulf and joint surveillance of the South China Sea. The Persian Gulf is a vital global trade and energy transit hub. At the first rhetorical sign or indication of Iran ’ s intention to close the Strait of Hormuz, Japan should unilaterally send minesweepers to the region to counter this
internationally illegal move. Peace and stability in the South China Sea 南シナ海 are yet another vital allied interest with especially profound salience for Japan. With 88 percent of Japan ’ s supplies, including vital energy resources, transiting through the South China Sea, it is in Japan ’ s interest to increase surveillance in collaboration with the United States to ensure stability and continued freedom of navigation.
The distinction between the “ Defense of Japan ” and regional security is thin. A sealed-off Strait of Hormuz ホルムズ海峡 or a military contingency in the South China Sea will have severe implications 巻き込むこと for the security and stability of Japan. The once-touted sword and shield analogy
oversimplifies current security dynamics and glosses over the fact that Japan requires offensive responsibilities to provide for the defense of the nation. Both allies require more robust 強固な, shared, and interoperable 相互運用可能な Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR 諜報・監視・偵察 ) capabilities and operations that extend well beyond Japanese territory. For their part, U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) 駐留米軍 should have specific roles assigned in the defense of Japan. With the goal of operational competency 力量 and eventual USFJ-JSDF 自衛隊 joint task force capability in mind, the United States should allocate greater responsibility and sense of mission to the USFJ.