Top-level claims
The following table describes the top-level claims in the attestation token. These items are compliant with the OpenID Connect 1.0 specification .
Read more about attestation tokens
attester_tcb
One or more TCB (trusted computing base) components. This claim is to specify the source of attestation evidence.
For the hwmodel claim "GCP_INTEL_TDX"
on Confidential Space,
the value is set to ["INTEL"]
, indicating that the
attestation root of trust originates from Intel-specific hardware
technology.
aud
The audience. For the default token used with a workload identity
pool, the audience is https://sts.googleapis.com
. This
token is fetched every hour by the launcher in the Confidential VM
instance.
For tokens with custom audiences, the audience is echoed from the audience in the token request. The maximum length is 512 bytes.
dbgstat
disabled-since-boot
. In debug images, the value is enabled
.eat_nonce
exp
1970-01-01T0:0:0Z
as measured
in UTC until the expiry time.google_service_accounts
hwmodel
The unique identifier for the hardware token. Must be one of the following values:
-
GCP_AMD_SEV
-
GCP_AMD_SEV_ES
-
GCP_SHIELDED_VM
-
GCP_INTEL_TDX
iat
1970-01-01T0:0:0Z
as measured
in UTC until the issue time.iss
https://confidentialcomputing.googleapis.com
.nbf
1970-01-01T0:0:0Z
as measured
in UTC.secboot
true
.sub
https://www.googleapis.com/compute/v1/projects/ PROJECT_ID
/zones/ ZONE
/instances/ INSTANCE_ID
.
This format is known as the instance's selfLink
.swname
The name of the approved operating system for the VM.
Valid values are CONFIDENTIAL_SPACE
or GCE
.
The CONFIDENTIAL_SPACE
value is for hardened and debug
Confidential Space images that passed all validation.
swversion
The version of the operating system. The value is a string array that contains only one value.
The version follows the format YYYYMM##
, where ##
is a counter for the number of images released before
the image being used in the same month.
AWS principal tag claims
The following table describes the AWS_PrincipalTag
claims in the
attestation token. These claims are placed in the https://aws.amazon.com/tags
claims, in the principal_tags
object in the attestation token.
To learn about the https://aws.amazon.com/tags
claim structure,
see AWS principal tag claims
.
Key | Type | Description |
---|---|---|
confidential_space.support_attributes
|
String array | Derivative claim of support attributes. This is a concatenated string representation of the original claims. For example, if the original claims are |
container.image_digest
|
String array | See Workload container claims . Container image signatures and digests don't appear together in a
single token. If you're using |
container.signatures.key_id
|
String array | A concatenated list of container image signature key IDs. This field represents multiple signature key IDs joined into a single string in the array. For example, if you have key IDs Container image signatures and digests don't appear together in a
single token. If you are using For more information on container image signature claims, see AWS policies with container image signature claims . |
gce.project_id
|
String array | See Compute Engine claims . |
gce.zone
|
String array | See Compute Engine claims . |
Intel TDX claims
The following table describes the tdx
claims in the attestation token.
Key | Type | Description |
---|---|---|
gcp_attester_tcb_status
|
String | A string value that represents the TCB level status of the
Google Cloud platform being evaluated. For more information about This claim indicates that the TDX TCB version was up to date with Intel's reference values when Google began its firmware rollout. However, it doesn't guarantee that the Google fleet remains up to date with Intel's real-time TCB reference values. |
gcp_attester_tcb_date
|
String | The TCB date for the attesting Google Cloud platform. The time value is
UTC in ISO 8601 format (YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ssZ)
. |
Submods claims
The following table describes the submods
claims in the attestation token.
confidential_space.support_attributes
EXPERIMENTAL
, USABLE
, STABLE
, and LATEST
. For
more information, see Confidential Space image lifecycle
.confidential_space.monitoring_enabled
{"memory":false}
or {"memory":true}
.The Confidential Computing status of the NVIDIA GPU. This claim attests to the GPU driver only, not the entire GPU device.
The value can be one of the following:
-
OFF
: none of the NVIDIA Confidential Computing features are active. -
ON
: the NVIDIA H100 hardware, firmware, and software have fully activated the confidential computing features. -
DEVTOOLS
: the GPU is in a partial confidential computing mode that matches the workflows ofON
mode, but disables security protections.
Compute Engine claims
The following table describes the gce
claims in the attestation token.
Key | Type | Description |
---|---|---|
instance_id
|
String | The VM instance ID. |
instance_name
|
String | The VM instance name. |
project_id
|
String | The project ID for the project that the VM is running in. |
project_number
|
String | The project number for the project that the VM is running in. |
zone
|
String | The Compute Engine zone where the Confidential VM instance is running. |
Workload container claims
The following table describes the container
claims in the attestation token.
For more information about these claims, see Attestation assertions
.
Key | Type | Description |
---|---|---|
args
|
String array | The full argv
the container is invoked with. This claim
includes the container's entrypoint path and any additional command-line
arguments. |
cmd_override
|
String array | The CMD commands and parameters used in the workload image. |
env
|
Object | The environment variables and their values that have been explicitly passed to the container. |
env_override
|
Object | The overwritten environment variables in the container. |
image_digest
|
String | The image digest of the workload container. |
image_id
|
String | The image ID of the workload container. |
image_reference
|
String | The location of the workload container running in Confidential Space. |
image_signatures
|
Object array | See Container image signature claims . |
restart_policy
|
String | The restart policy of the container launcher when the workload stops.
Valid values are Always
, OnFailure
, and Never
. Default is Never
. |
Container image signature claims
The following table describes the image_signatures
claims in the attestation
token.
key_id
The hexadecimal fingerprint of the public key. To get the fingerprint, you can run the following command:
openssl pkey -pubin -in public_key.pem -outform DER | openssl sha256
Where public_key.pem
is your public key in
PEM format.
signature
signature_algorithm
The algorithm used to sign the key. One of the following:
-
RSASSA_PSS_SHA256
(RSASSA-PSS with a SHA-256 digest) -
RSASSA_PKCS1V15_SHA256
(RSASSA-PKCS1 v1_5 with a SHA-256 digest) -
ECDSA_P256_SHA256
(ECDSA on the P-256 Curve with a SHA-256 digest)
What's next
-
See the IETF draft for The Entity Attestation Token (EAT) for more information on attestation claims.
-
See the OpenID Connect Core 1.0 for more information on OpenID token claims.