Slaying the New York Devils

January 1, 2009 by · 3 Comments

The Yankees’ dominance of the off-season free agent market has not sparked the outrage of a Madoff or Blagojevich. Yet even in these days when shock and awe have been defined upward by the wild events of the day, the Yankee’s outsized spending spree renders those of us outside that sphere of influence incredulous. Is there a tipping point where the Yankees’ influence within the game is more than just unseemly and demands addressing effectively? New York City is the leviathan that tips the continent toward the east, a metropolitan region one and one half times as large as any other metro area. There are nineteen million persons living in the New York City MSA compared with thirteen million in Los Angeles and less than ten in Chicago. Of the twenty-four other major league cities, ten have populations between four and six million. The other fourteen–the true small market teams–are between 1.5 and 3.3 million in size. Baseball has done wonders to achieve competitive balance between the largest and smallest (Milwaukee) markets, but this winter’s off-season moves raise the question whether more needs to be done.

Fans in the New York City area are right to say that they did not make the system and it would be crazy for them to ignore it. As one fan said recently in the New York Times , baseball fans should see the Steinbrenner’s spending as a stimulus package for the rest of baseball. But is a Yes Network in Manhattan that sucks in twice as much revenue as the average for the other teams and almost one hundred million more than the second place Mets (see my article, “Size Matters”) really just to be taken for granted? Is it part of the landscape we cannot escape?

In the 1990’s Commissioner Bud Selig asked the equally fair question, ‘what can be done to give fans in other cities “faith and hope” that their teams have a realistic chance to win?’ The answer was revenue sharing and a luxury tax that redistributes a portion of what the Yes Network brings in to other teams in a complex formula. Yet it is clear from the money the large market teams–especially the Yankees–are throwing around that the table is still so tilted that half of the teams have an uphill march they can ill afford.

The one thing that mega-markets in metropolitan areas New York, Chicago and Los Angeles have in common is multiple franchises. However, when the media markets for Chicago and Los Angeles are divided to reflect multiple teams, they compare reasonably well in size to many other franchises. Yet dividing New York City proportionally between the Mets and Yankees still leaves two markets that exceed everything in sight–almost 10 million fans for each team compared to the new largest, the Dodgers and Angels with more than six million. Most of the mid-market teams, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, Dallas and Atlanta are in that range.

The other professional sports have solved this problem in different ways. A salary cap levels the playing field in basketball and football, but such a cap in baseball will not happen. Besides, there are more interesting possibilities. Despite a cap, New York City still supports two successful professional franchises in basketball and football. In hockey the situation is different. There are not only the New York Rangers and New York Islanders, but also a third team–the New Jersey Devils. Northern New Jersey is a key component of the New York MSA and its media market, so professional hockey has divided NYC into three market shares. Hmmnnn….

So does baseball need a New York or New Jersey Devils team to provide that final component of competitive balance that finishes the masterpiece begun by Bud Selig at the beginning of the 21st century? A Blue Ribbon Panel–George Will, Paul Volcker, George Mitchell and Richard Levin–issued recommendations on competitive balance in July of 2001 that were implemented when the luxury tax and revenue sharing were adopted as part of the collective bargaining agreements in 2002 and 2006. But to those of us watching the Yankees acquire every big name free agent for the 2009 season, it is fair to ask whether the recommendations went far enough.

And then there is the issue of precedence. In 1950 when there were only 16 baseball teams–eight in the National and eight in the American Leagues there were three professional baseball teams in New York. Yet for all of the decades leading up to the 1960’s (when baseball began its expansion) the Dodgers, Giants, and Yankees dominated the sport even then when their relative affluence depended almost solely on gate receipts. For decades the three teams in the Big Apple were able to out draw every other team in Major League Baseball by so much that they were among the most successful year in and year out. Even with three teams in the city, the Yankees were so much more affluent than their rivals that they could maintain their own subsidiary franchise in Kansas City buying players from the Athletics as a way of keeping that franchise afloat.

So is it fair that there are only two major league franchises in New York City? Could the playing field be leveled by allowing a third franchise in the New York City such as exists today for Hockey? Baseball expansion has not been on the table for more than a decade and in the current economic climate it is unlikely to be discussed again. But the issue is one that needs to be raised in the future.

Baseball is resurgent and when the economy allows it there should be discussion of moving major league baseball into cities like Indianapolis, Las Vegas, and Charlotte. But more than anything the sport needs to include a third franchise in the New York City metro area. It may be dreamy-eyed to propose such a solution in today’s market place, but it is the solution to New York City’s outsized influence in the game and it deserves to be on the table.

Until then many teams can only look up at the Yankees and dream and model themselves after the small number of small market success stories. This year our hopes lie with the lowly Tampa Bay Rays. For us who question the Yankees and their overworn size, they are the ultimate heroes of competitive balance. So go forth Evan Longoria, BJ Upton, Carlos Pena and Scott Kazmir. Pull the sword from the stone, my beamish boys. Snicker snack goes the vorpal blades of competitive balance. Callooh, Callay!! The Yanks lose out on the very last day.

Comments

3 Responses to “Slaying the New York Devils”
  1. Justin says:

    Hmm, I don’t know about that. As you point out, the situation was hardly different when there were three teams in NYC, although the west was not yet a part of the equation. The Yankees and Mets would both certainly be vociferous in opposing a third team (just like the Sabres and Maple Leafs are against one in Southern Ontario). Another problem would be supplying another 25 major league level players- I don’t know that they’re available right now. Of course, that’s a point against expansion in general, not just NYC.

  2. Bob R. says:

    The object of the game is to contend for post-season play, not to end up with the highest payroll. So yes, the Yankees win the payroll competition, but that is not terribly meaningful.

    The past 10 years (or 20 years if you like) have been the most competitive in the history of baseball by almost any measure you use. You can consider the % of teams making the post-season, the % of teams that endure long periods of non-contention, the % of teams that have sub-.400 or sub .300 records or practically any other meaningful criteria and you will conclude that payroll disparity has little if any effect on the ability of teams to contend.

    It is true that at the extremes, especially the upper end, it allows NY to remain competitive (which has nearly always been the case anyway), but otherwise there is little correlation between payrolls and final standings. It is also true that there are other advantages teams enjoy besides payroll. Weather, baseball history, front office creativity, state laws (such as tax structures) and much more influences where players sign. Perhaps not to the extent of salary, but checking rosters makes clear there is plenty of talent available to everyone.

    In fact, it might be useful to ask whether signing the big free agents is not a benefit to the less affluent clubs. With rare exceptions, those contracts come as players enter their decline phase, or continue into that phase, while it is the clubs focused on developing young talent that get their value at its peak. So allowing the expensive players go clears space for better talent while burdening other clubs with onerous contracts.

  3. Ted Leavengood says:

    “There is little correlation between payrolls and final standings.” That statement has no facts to back it up because the broad sweep of historical data is arrayed against it. I suggest Andrew Zimbalist’s book, “May the Best Team Win” as a resource and specifically pages 42-53. On page 43, the statement is made, “The Commissioners Office has issued two reports detailing the lack of balance since 1995…from 1995 to 2001 only four teams from the bottom half of payrolls reached the post-season…none went beyond the first round.” There is a regression analysis on page 44 that details competitive balance between 1980 and 2001 and the positive correlation between payroll and win percentage is a strong one.

    So your statement “The past 10 years (or 20 if you like) have been the most competitive in the history of baseball by any measure you use,” offers nothing to disprove the studies cited by Zimbalist and as far as I am concerned, your dog don’t hunt. If you have numbers please share them. As I stated, balance seems to have improved since revenue sharing, and last season when Tampa Bay and Milwaukee–two of the smallest markets–made the playoffs, they provided the first reasons for hope since the new century began. But if you define small market teams as those fifteen teams whose market and revenues are at the bottom, then they make up the bottom tier of each league consistently. Saying that ain’t so, don’t make it so.

    What might prove entertaining would be an explanation as to how the Yankees signing of Mark Teixeira benefits the Florida Marlins. Again you provide not even anecdotal evidence to support your rather bold concept that running young players through certain teams for a few years before they are lured away by large market teams is a good thing for the team that loses their services.

    A player’s peak years are between 28 and 32 and small market teams have the services of the highest caliber players for only five years before the market lures them to the wealthy teams. That provides at most a year or so of peak preformance. I am certain that any GM from the smaller markets would express nothing except frustration at paying the costs to develop young talent only to lose it for exactly those peak years.

    Branch Rickey created the farm system to address competitive balance issues years ago and it worked for several decades. He raided the Negro Leagues for the same reasons–lower priced talent. Rickey had the reserve clause to keep players at his beck and call. Free agency put all of that into a cocked hat and it is only in the last few years that anything has been done to address it.

    To his credit, Bud Selig–from the smallest market of all–sought to level the playing field and progress has been made. But if you want to sell me your “bridge to no where” my friend then let’s see some numbers.

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