Overview of Event Threat Detection

What is Event Threat Detection?

Event Threat Detection is a built-in service for the Security Command Center Premium tier that continuously monitors your organization or projects and identifies threats within your systems in near-real time. Event Threat Detection is regularly updated with new detectors to identify emerging threats at cloud scale.

How Event Threat Detection works

Event Threat Detection monitors the Cloud Logging stream for your organization or projects. If you activate Security Command Center Premium tier at the organization level, Event Threat Detection consumes logs for your projects as they are created and Event Threat Detection can monitor Google Workspace Logs . Cloud Logging contains log entries of API calls and other actions that create, read, or modify the configuration or metadata of your resources. Google Workspace logs track user sign-ins to your domain and provide a record of actions performed on your Google Workspace Admin Console.

Log entries contain status and event information that Event Threat Detection uses to quickly detect threats. Event Threat Detection applies detection logic and proprietary threat intelligence, including tripwire indicator matching, windowed profiling, advanced profiling, machine learning, and anomaly detection, to identify threats in near-real time.

When Event Threat Detection detects a threat, it writes a finding to Security Command Center. If you activate Security Command Center Premium tier at the organization level, Security Command Center can write findings to a Cloud Logging project. From Cloud Logging and Google Workspace logging, you can export findings to other systems with Pub/Sub and process them with Cloud Run functions.

If you activate Security Command Center Premium tier at the organization level, you can additionally use Google Security Operations to investigate some findings. Google SecOps is a Google Cloud service that lets you investigate threats and pivot through related entities in a unified timeline. For instructions on sending findings to Google SecOps, see Investigate findings in Google SecOps .

Your ability to view and edit findings and logs is determined by the Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles you are granted. For more information on Security Command Center IAM roles, see Access control .

Event Threat Detection rules

Rules define the type of threats that Event Threat Detection detects and the types of logs that must be enabled for detectors to work. Admin Activityaudit logs are always written; you can't configure or disable them.

Event Threat Detection includes the following default rules:

Display name
API name
Log source types
Description
Active Scan: Log4j Vulnerable to RCE
Unavailable
Log4j vulnerability scanners initiated and identified DNS queries for unobfuscated domains. This vulnerability can lead to remote code execution (RCE). Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Impact: Deleted Google Cloud Backup and DR host
BACKUP_HOSTS_DELETE_HOST
A host was deleted from the Backup and DR management console. Applications that are associated with the deleted host might not be protected. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR expire image
BACKUP_EXPIRE_IMAGE
A user requested the deletion of a backup image from the Backup and DR management console. The deletion of a backup image does not prevent future backups. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR remove plan
BACKUP_REMOVE_PLAN
A backup plan with multiple policies for an application was deleted from Backup and DR. The deletion of a backup plan can prevent future backups. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR expire all images
BACKUP_EXPIRE_IMAGES_ALL
A user requested the deletion of all backup images for a protected application from the Backup and DR management console. The deletion of backup images does not prevent future backups. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete template
BACKUP_TEMPLATES_DELETE_TEMPLATE
A predefined backup template, which is used to set up backups for multiple applications, was deleted from the Backup and DR management console. The ability to set up backups in the future might be impacted. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete policy
BACKUP_TEMPLATES_DELETE_POLICY
A Backup and DR policy, which defines how a backup is taken and where it is stored, was deleted from the Backup and DR management console. Future backups that use the policy might fail. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete profile
BACKUP_PROFILES_DELETE_PROFILE
A Backup and DR profile, which defines which storage pools should be used to store backups, was deleted from the Backup and DR management console. Future backups that use the profile might fail. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR remove appliance
BACKUP_APPLIANCES_REMOVE_APPLIANCE
A backup appliance was deleted from the Backup and DR management console. Applications that are associated with the deleted backup appliance might not be protected. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete storage pool
BACKUP_STORAGE_POOLS_DELETE
A storage pool, which associates a Cloud Storage bucket with Backup and DR, was removed from the Backup and DR management console. Future backups to this storage target will fail. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR reduced backup expiration
BACKUP_REDUCE_BACKUP_EXPIRATION
The expiration date for a backup protected by Backup and DR was reduced through the Backup and DR management console. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR reduced backup frequency
BACKUP_REDUCE_BACKUP_FREQUENCY
The Backup and DR backup schedule was modified to reduce backup frequency through the Backup and DR management console. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Impact: Deleted Google Cloud Backup and DR Vault
BACKUP_DELETE_VAULT
A backup vault was deleted. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Impact: Deleted Google Cloud Backup and DR Backup
BACKUP_DELETE_VAULT_BACKUP
A backup stored in a backup vault was manually deleted. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Impact: Deleted Google Cloud Backup and DR plan association
BACKUP_DELETE_BACKUP_PLAN_ASSOCIATION
A backup plan from Backup and DR was removed from a workload. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Brute force SSH
BRUTE_FORCE_SSH
An actor successfully gained SSH access on a host through brute force techniques. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Cloud IDS: THREAT_IDENTIFIER
CLOUD_IDS_THREAT_ACTIVITY

Cloud IDS detected threat events.

Cloud IDS detects layer 7 attacks by analyzing mirrored packets and, when a threat event is detected, sends a threat-class finding to Security Command Center. Finding category names start with "Cloud IDS" followed by the Cloud IDS threat identifier.

The Cloud IDS integration with Event Threat Detection does not include Cloud IDS vulnerability detections. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.

To learn more about Cloud IDS detections, see Cloud IDS Logging information .

Privilege Escalation: External Member Added To Privileged Group
EXTERNAL_MEMBER_ADDED_TO_PRIVILEGED_GROUP
Google Workspace Logs :
Login Audit
Permissions :
DATA_READ

An external member was added to a privileged Google Group (a group granted sensitive roles or permissions). A finding is generated only if the group doesn't already contain other external members from the same organization as the newly added member. To learn more, see Unsafe Google Group changes .

This finding isn't available for project-level activations. Findings are classified as Highor Mediumseverity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles associated with the group change. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions .

Privilege Escalation: Privileged Group Opened To Public
PRIVILEGED_GROUP_OPENED_TO_PUBLIC
Google Workspace :
Admin Audit
Permissions :
DATA_READ

A privileged Google Group (a group granted sensitive roles or permissions) was changed to be accessible to the general public. To learn more, see Unsafe Google Group changes .

This finding isn't available for project-level activations. Findings are classified as Highor Mediumseverity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles associated with the group change. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions .

Privilege Escalation: Sensitive Role Granted To Hybrid Group
SENSITIVE_ROLE_TO_GROUP_WITH_EXTERNAL_MEMBER
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs

Sensitive roles were granted to a Google Group with external members. To learn more, see Unsafe Google Group changes .

Findings are classified as Highor Mediumseverity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles associated with the group change. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions .

Defense Evasion: Breakglass Workload Deployment Created ( Preview )
BINARY_AUTHORIZATION_BREAKGLASS_WORKLOAD_CREATE
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs
Workloads were deployed by using the break-glass flag to override Binary Authorization controls. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Defense Evasion: Breakglass Workload Deployment Updated ( Preview )
BINARY_AUTHORIZATION_BREAKGLASS_WORKLOAD_UPDATE
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs
Workloads were updated by using the break-glass flag to override Binary Authorization controls. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Defense Evasion: GCS Bucket IP Filtering Modified
GCS_BUCKET_IP_FILTERING_MODIFIED
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs
A user or service account changed the IP filtering configuration for a Cloud Storage bucket. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Defense Evasion: Modify VPC Service Control
DEFENSE_EVASION_MODIFY_VPC_SERVICE_CONTROL

An existing VPC Service Controls perimeter was changed that would lead to a reduction in the protection offered by that perimeter.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.

Defense Evasion: Project HTTP Policy Block Disabled
PROJECT_HTTP_POLICY_BLOCK_DISABLED
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs
A user or service account successfully triggered an action to disable storage.secureHttpTransport on a project. This also applies when the action is taken at an org-level or folder-level since policies applied at this level are inherited by child projects by default. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Discovery: Can get sensitive Kubernetes object check
GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_CAN_GET_SENSITIVE_OBJECT
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Data Access logs

A potentially malicious actor attempted to determine what sensitive objects in GKE they can query for, by using the kubectl auth can-i get command. Specifically, the rule detects whether the actor checked for API access on the following objects:

Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.

Discovery: Service Account Self-Investigation
SERVICE_ACCOUNT_SELF_INVESTIGATION
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Data Access audit logs
Permissions :
DATA_READ

An IAM service account credential was used to investigate the roles and permissions associated with that same service account.

Sensitive roles

Findings are classified as Highor Mediumseverity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles granted. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions .

Evasion: Access from Anonymizing Proxy
ANOMALOUS_ACCESS
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs
Google Cloud service modifications originated from an IP address associated with the Tor network. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Exfiltration: BigQuery Data Exfiltration
DATA_EXFILTRATION_BIG_QUERY
Cloud Audit Logs : BigQueryAuditMetadata data access logs
Permissions :
DATA_READ

Detects the following scenarios:

  • Resources owned by the protected organization were saved outside of the organization, including copy or transfer operations.

    This scenario is indicated by a subrule of exfil_to_external_table and Highseverity.

  • Attempts were made to access BigQuery resources that are protected by VPC Service Controls.

    This scenario is indicated by a subrule of vpc_perimeter_violation and Lowseverity.

Exfiltration: BigQuery Data Extraction
DATA_EXFILTRATION_BIG_QUERY_EXTRACTION
Cloud Audit Logs : BigQueryAuditMetadata data access logs
Permissions :
DATA_READ

Detects the following scenarios:

  • A BigQuery resource owned by the protected organization was saved, through extraction operations, to a Cloud Storage bucket outside the organization.
  • A BigQuery resource owned by the protected organization was saved, through extraction operations, to a publicly accessible Cloud Storage bucket owned by that organization.

For project-level activations of the Security Command Center Premium tier, this finding is available only if the Standard tier is enabled in the parent organization.. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.

Exfiltration: BigQuery Data to Google Drive
DATA_EXFILTRATION_BIG_QUERY_TO_GOOGLE_DRIVE
Cloud Audit Logs : BigQueryAuditMetadata data access logs
Permissions :
DATA_READ
A BigQuery resource that is owned by the protected organization was saved, through extraction operations, to a Google Drive folder. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Exfiltration: Move to Public BigQuery resource
DATA_EXFILTRATION_BIG_QUERY_TO_PUBLIC_RESOURCE
Cloud Audit Logs : BigQueryAuditMetadata data access logs
Permissions :
DATA_READ

A BigQuery resource was saved to a public resource owned by your organization. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.

Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Data Exfiltration
CLOUDSQL_EXFIL_EXPORT_TO_EXTERNAL_GCS
CLOUDSQL_EXFIL_EXPORT_TO_PUBLIC_GCS

Detects the following scenarios:

  • Live instance data was exported to a Cloud Storage bucket outside of the organization.
  • Live instance data was exported to a Cloud Storage bucket that is owned by the organization and is publicly accessible.

For project-level activations of the Security Command Center Premium tier, this finding is available only if the Standard tier is enabled in the parent organization.. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.

Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Restore Backup to External Organization
CLOUDSQL_EXFIL_RESTORE_BACKUP_TO_EXTERNAL_INSTANCE

The backup of a Cloud SQL instance was restored to an instance outside of the organization. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.

Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Over-Privileged Grant
CLOUDSQL_EXFIL_USER_GRANTED_ALL_PERMISSIONS
Cloud Audit Logs : PostgreSQL data access logs
Note : You must enable the pgAudit extension to use this rule.
A Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL user or role was granted all privileges to a database, or to all tables, procedures, or functions in a schema. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Initial Access: Database Superuser Writes to User Tables
CLOUDSQL_SUPERUSER_WRITES_TO_USER_TABLES
Cloud Audit Logs : Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL data access logs
Cloud SQL for MySQL data access logs
Note : You must enable the pgAudit extension for PostgreSQL or database auditing for MySQL to use this rule.
A Cloud SQL superuser ( postgres for PostgreSQL servers or root for MySQL users) wrote to non-system tables. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: AlloyDB Over-Privileged Grant
ALLOYDB_USER_GRANTED_ALL_PERMISSIONS
Cloud Audit Logs : AlloyDB for PostgreSQL data access logs
Note : You must enable the pgAudit extension to use this rule.
An AlloyDB for PostgreSQL user or role was granted all privileges to a database, or to all tables, procedures, or functions in a schema. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: AlloyDB Database Superuser Writes to User Tables
ALLOYDB_SUPERUSER_WRITES_TO_USER_TABLES
Cloud Audit Logs : AlloyDB for PostgreSQL data access logs
Note : You must enable the pgAudit extension to use this rule.
An AlloyDB for PostgreSQL superuser ( postgres ) wrote to non-system tables. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Initial Access: Dormant Service Account Action
DORMANT_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_USED_IN_ACTION
Cloud Audit Logs : Admin Activity logs
A dormant user-managed service account triggered an action. In this context, a service account is considered dormant if it has been inactive for more than 180 days. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Dormant Service Account Granted Sensitive Role
DORMANT_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ADDED_IN_IAM_ROLE
Cloud Audit Logs : IAM Admin Activity audit logs

A dormant user-managed service account was granted one or more sensitive IAM roles. In this context, a service account is considered dormant if it has been inactive for more than 180 days.

Sensitive roles

Findings are classified as Highor Mediumseverity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles granted. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions .

Privilege Escalation: Impersonation Role Granted For Dormant Service Account
DORMANT_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_IMPERSONATION_ROLE_GRANTED
Cloud Audit Logs : IAM Admin Activity audit logs
A principal was granted permissions to impersonate a dormant user-managed service account. In this context, a service account is considered dormant if it has been inactive for more than 180 days. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Initial Access: Dormant Service Account Key Created
DORMANT_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY_CREATED
Cloud Audit Logs : Admin Activity logs
A key was created for a dormant user-managed service account . In this context, a service account is considered dormant if it has been inactive for more than 180 days. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Initial Access: Leaked Service Account Key Used
LEAKED_SA_KEY_USED
A leaked service account key was used to authenticate the action. In this context, a leaked service account key is one that was posted on the public internet. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Initial Access: Excessive Permission Denied Actions
EXCESSIVE_FAILED_ATTEMPT
Cloud Audit Logs : Admin Activity logs
A principal repeatedly triggered permission denied errors by attempting changes across multiple methods and services. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Persistence: Strong Authentication Disabled
Google Workspace :
Admin Audit

2-step verification was disabled for the organization.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.

Persistence: Two Step Verification Disabled
Google Workspace Logs :
Login Audit
Permissions :
DATA_READ

A user disabled 2-step verification.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.

Initial Access: Account Disabled Hijacked
Google Workspace Logs :
Login Audit
Permissions :
DATA_READ

A user's account was suspended due to suspicious activity.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.

Initial Access: Disabled Password Leak
Google Workspace Logs :
Login Audit
Permissions :
DATA_READ

A user's account was disabled because a password leak was detected.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.

Initial Access: Government Based Attack
Google Workspace Logs :
Login Audit
Permissions :
DATA_READ

Government-backed attackers might have tried to compromise a user account or computer.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.

Initial Access: Log4j Compromise Attempt
Unavailable
Cloud Load Balancing Logs :
Cloud HTTP Load Balancer
Note : You must enable external Application Load Balancer logging to use this rule.

Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI) lookups within headers or URL parameters were detected. These lookups might indicate attempts at Log4Shell exploitation. These findings have low severity, because they only indicate a detection or exploit attempt, not a vulnerability or a compromise.

This rule is always on. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.

Initial Access: Suspicious Login Blocked
Google Workspace Logs :
Login Audit
Permissions :
DATA_READ

A suspicious login to a user's account was detected and blocked.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.

Log4j Malware: Bad Domain
LOG4J_BAD_DOMAIN
Log4j exploit traffic was detected based on a connection to, or a lookup of, a known domain used in Log4j attacks. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Log4j Malware: Bad IP
LOG4J_BAD_IP
Log4j exploit traffic was detected based on a connection to a known IP address used in Log4j attacks. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Malware: bad domain
MALWARE_BAD_DOMAIN
Malware was detected based on a connection to, or a lookup of, a known bad domain. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Malware: bad IP
MALWARE_BAD_IP
Malware was detected based on a connection to a known bad IP address. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Malware: Cryptomining Bad Domain
CRYPTOMINING_POOL_DOMAIN
Cryptomining was detected based on a connection to, or a lookup of, a known mining domain. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Malware: Cryptomining Bad IP
CRYPTOMINING_POOL_IP
Cryptomining was detected based on a connection to a known mining IP address. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Persistence: GCE Admin Added SSH Key
GCE_ADMIN_ADD_SSH_KEY
The Compute Engine instance metadata SSH key value was modified on an established instance (older than 1 week). Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Persistence: GCE Admin Added Startup Script
GCE_ADMIN_ADD_STARTUP_SCRIPT
The Compute Engine instance metadata startup script value was modified on an established instance (older than 1 week). Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Persistence: IAM Anomalous Grant
IAM_ANOMALOUS_GRANT
Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs

This finding includes subrules that provide more specific information about each instance of this finding.

The following list shows all possible subrules:

  • external_service_account_added_to_policy , external_member_added_to_policy : Privileges were granted to IAM users and service accounts that are not members of your organization or, if Security Command Center is activated at the project level only, your project.

    Note : If Security Command Center is activated at the organization level at any tier, then this detector uses an organization's existing IAM policies as context. If Security Command Center activation is only at the project level, then the detector uses only the project's IAM policies as context.

    If a sensitive IAM grant to an external member occurs, and there are less than three existing IAM policies that are similar to it, this detector generates a finding.

    Sensitive roles

    Findings are classified as Highor Mediumseverity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles granted. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions .

  • external_member_invited_to_policy : An external member was invited as the owner of the project through the InsertProjectOwnershipInvite API.
  • custom_role_given_sensitive_permissions : The setIAMPolicy permission was added to a custom role.
  • service_account_granted_sensitive_role_to_member : Privileged roles were granted to members through a service account. This subrule is triggered by a subset of sensitive roles that include only basic IAM roles and certain data storage roles. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions .
  • policy_modified_by_default_compute_service_account : A default Compute Engine service account was used to modify project IAM settings.
Persistence: Unmanaged Account Granted Sensitive Role ( Preview )
UNMANAGED_ACCOUNT_ADDED_IN_IAM_ROLE
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
A sensitive role was granted to an unmanaged account . Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Persistence: New API Method
ANOMALOUS_BEHAVIOR_NEW_API_METHOD
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs
IAM service accounts used anomalous access to Google Cloud services. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Persistence: New Geography
IAM_ANOMALOUS_BEHAVIOR_IP_GEOLOCATION
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs

IAM user and service accounts accessed Google Cloud from anomalous locations, based on the geolocation of the requesting IP addresses.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations and they are classified as Lowseverity by default.

Persistence: New User Agent
IAM_ANOMALOUS_BEHAVIOR_USER_AGENT
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs

IAM service accounts accessed Google Cloud from anomalous or suspicious user agents.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.

Persistence: SSO Enablement Toggle
Google Workspace :
Admin Audit

The Enable SSO (single sign-on) setting on the admin account was disabled.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.

Persistence: SSO Settings Changed
Google Workspace :
Admin Audit

The SSO settings for the admin account were changed.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.

Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Impersonation of Service Account for Admin Activity
ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_IMPERSONATION_OF_SA_ADMIN_ACTIVITY
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs
A potentially anomalous impersonated service account was used for an administrative activity. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Multistep Service Account Delegation for Admin Activity
ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_MULTISTEP_ADMIN_ACTIVITY
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs
An anomalous multistep delegated request was found for an administrative activity. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Multistep Service Account Delegation for Data Access
ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_MULTISTEP_DATA_ACCESS
Cloud Audit Logs :
Data Access logs
An anomalous multistep delegated request was found for a data access activity. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Service Account Impersonator for Admin Activity
ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_IMPERSONATOR_ADMIN_ACTIVITY
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs
A potentially anomalous caller or impersonator in a delegation chain was used for an administrative activity. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Service Account Impersonator for Data Access
ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_IMPERSONATOR_DATA_ACCESS
Cloud Audit Logs :
Data Access logs
A potentially anomalous caller or impersonator in a delegation chain was used for a data access activity. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Changes to sensitive Kubernetes RBAC objects
GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_EDIT_SENSITIVE_RBAC_OBJECT
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
To escalate privilege, a potentially malicious actor attempted to modify a ClusterRole , RoleBinding , or ClusterRoleBinding role-based access control (RBAC) object of the sensitive cluster-admin role by using a PUT or PATCH request. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Create Kubernetes CSR for master cert
GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_CSR_FOR_MASTER_CERT
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
A potentially malicious actor created a Kubernetes master certificate signing request (CSR), which gives them cluster-admin access. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Creation of sensitive Kubernetes bindings
GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_CREATE_SENSITIVE_BINDING
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
To escalate privilege, a potentially malicious actor attempted to create a new RoleBinding or ClusterRoleBinding object for the cluster-admin role. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Get Kubernetes CSR with compromised bootstrap credentials
GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_GET_CSR_WITH_COMPROMISED_BOOTSTRAP_CREDENTIALS
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Data Access logs
A potentially malicious actor queried for a certificate signing request (CSR), with the kubectl command, using compromised bootstrap credentials. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Launch of privileged Kubernetes container
GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_LAUNCH_PRIVILEGED_CONTAINER
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs

A potentially malicious actor created a Pod that contains privileged containers or containers with privilege escalation capabilities.

A privileged container has the privileged field set to true . A container with privilege escalation capabilities has the allowPrivilegeEscalation field set to true . For more information, see the SecurityContext v1 core API reference in the Kubernetes documentation. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.

Persistence: Service Account Key Created
SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY_CREATION
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
A service account key was created. Service account keys are long-lived credentials that increase the risk of unauthorized access to Google Cloud resources. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Global Shutdown Script Added
GLOBAL_SHUTDOWN_SCRIPT_ADDED
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
A global shutdown script was added to a project. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Persistence: Global Startup Script Added
GLOBAL_STARTUP_SCRIPT_ADDED
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
A global startup script was added to a project. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Defense Evasion: Organization-Level Service Account Token Creator Role Added
ORG_LEVEL_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN_CREATOR_ROLE_ADDED
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
The Service Account Token Creator IAM role was granted at the organization level. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Defense Evasion: Project-Level Service Account Token Creator Role Added
PROJECT_LEVEL_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN_CREATOR_ROLE_ADDED
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
The Service Account Token Creator IAM role was granted at the project level. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Lateral Movement: OS Patch Execution From Service Account
OS_PATCH_EXECUTION_FROM_SERVICE_ACCOUNT
Cloud Audit Logs .
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
A service account used the Compute Engine Patch feature to update the operating system of any currently running Compute Engine instance. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Lateral Movement: Modified Boot Disk Attached to Instance ( Preview )
MODIFY_BOOT_DISK_ATTACH_TO_INSTANCE
Cloud Audit Logs :
Compute Engine audit logs
A boot disk was detached from one Compute Engine instance and attached to another, which could indicate a malicious attempt to compromise the system using a modified boot disk. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Credential Access: Secrets Accessed In Kubernetes Namespace
SECRETS_ACCESSED_IN_KUBERNETES_NAMESPACE
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Data Access logs
Secrets or service account tokens were accessed by a service account in the current Kubernetes namespace. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Resource Development: Offensive Security Distro Activity
OFFENSIVE_SECURITY_DISTRO_ACTIVITY
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
A Google Cloud resource was successfully manipulated through known penetration testing or offensive security distros. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: New Service Account is Owner or Editor
SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EDITOR_OWNER
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
A new service account was created with Editor or Owner roles for a project. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Discovery: Information Gathering Tool Used
INFORMATION_GATHERING_TOOL_USED
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
ScoutSuite usage was detected. ScoutSuite is a cloud security auditing tool that is known to be used by threat actors. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Token Generation
SUSPICIOUS_TOKEN_GENERATION_IMPLICIT_DELEGATION
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
The iam.serviceAccounts.implicitDelegation permission was misused to generate access tokens from a more privileged service account. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Token Generation
SUSPICIOUS_TOKEN_GENERATION_SIGN_JWT
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
A service account used the serviceAccounts.signJwt method to generate an access token for another service account. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Token Generation
SUSPICIOUS_TOKEN_GENERATION_CROSS_PROJECT_OPENID
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs

The iam.serviceAccounts.getOpenIdToken IAM permission was used across projects.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.

Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Token Generation
SUSPICIOUS_TOKEN_GENERATION_CROSS_PROJECT_ACCESS_TOKEN
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs

The iam.serviceAccounts.getAccessToken IAM permission was used across projects.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.

Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Cross-Project Permission Use
SUSPICIOUS_CROSS_PROJECT_PERMISSION_DATAFUSION
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs

The datafusion.instances.create IAM permission was used across projects.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.

Command and Control: DNS Tunneling
DNS_TUNNELING_IODINE_HANDSHAKE
The handshake of the DNS tunneling tool Iodine was detected. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Defense Evasion: VPC Route Masquerade Attempt
VPC_ROUTE_MASQUERADE
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
VPC routes masquerading as Google Cloud default routes were manually created, allowing egress traffic to external IP addresses. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Impact: Billing Disabled
BILLING_DISABLED_SINGLE_PROJECT
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
Billing was disabled for a project. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Impact: Billing Disabled
BILLING_DISABLED_MULTIPLE_PROJECTS
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
Billing was disabled for multiple projects in an organization within a short time period. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Impact: VPC Firewall High Priority Block
VPC_FIREWALL_HIGH_PRIORITY_BLOCK
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
A VPC firewall rule that blocks all egress traffic was added at priority 0. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Impact: VPC Firewall Mass Rule Deletion Temporarily unavailable
VPC_FIREWALL_MASS_RULE_DELETION
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs

VPC firewall rules were mass deleted by non-service accounts.

This rule is temporarily unavailable. To monitor updates to your firewall rules, use the Cloud audit logs . Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.

Impact: Service API Disabled
SERVICE_API_DISABLED
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
A Google Cloud service API was disabled in a production environment. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Impact: Managed Instance Group Autoscaling Set To Maximum
MIG_AUTOSCALING_SET_TO_MAX
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
A managed instance group was configured for maximum autoscaling. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Discovery: Unauthorized Service Account API Call
UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_API_CALL
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM Admin Activity audit logs
A service account made an unauthorized cross-project API call. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Defense Evasion: Anonymous Sessions Granted Cluster Admin Access
ANONYMOUS_SESSIONS_GRANTED_CLUSTER_ADMIN
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
A role-based access control (RBAC) ClusterRoleBinding object was created, adding the root-cluster-admin-binding behavior to anonymous users. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Persistence: New Geography for AI Service
AI_IAM_ANOMALOUS_BEHAVIOR_IP_GEOLOCATION
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs

IAM user and service accounts accessed Google Cloud AI services from anomalous locations, based on the geolocation of the requesting IP addresses.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations and they are classified as Lowseverity by default.

Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Multistep Service Account Delegation for AI Admin Activity
AI_ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_MULTISTEP_ADMIN_ACTIVITY
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs
An anomalous multistep delegated request was found for an administrative activity of an AI service. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Multistep Service Account Delegation for AI Data Access
AI_ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_MULTISTEP_DATA_ACCESS
Cloud Audit Logs :
Data Access logs
An anomalous multistep delegated request was found for a data access activity of an AI service. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Service Account Impersonator for AI Admin Activity
AI_ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_IMPERSONATOR_ADMIN_ACTIVITY
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs
A potentially anomalous caller or impersonator in a delegation chain was used for an administrative activity of an AI service. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Service Account Impersonator for AI Data Access
AI_ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_IMPERSONATOR_DATA_ACCESS
Cloud Audit Logs :
Data Access logs
A potentially anomalous caller or impersonator in a delegation chain was used for a data access activity of an AI service. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Impersonation of Service Account for AI Admin Activity
AI_ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_IMPERSONATION_OF_SA_ADMIN_ACTIVITY
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs
A potentially anomalous impersonated service account was used for an administrative activity of an AI service. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Persistence: New AI API Method
AI_ANOMALOUS_BEHAVIOR_NEW_API_METHOD
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs
IAM service accounts used anomalous access to Google Cloud AI services. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Initial Access: Dormant Service Account Activity in AI Service
AI_DORMANT_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_USED_IN_ACTION
Cloud Audit Logs : Admin Activity logs
A dormant user-managed service account triggered an action in AI services. In this context, a service account is considered dormant if it has been inactive for more than 180 days. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Initial Access: Anonymous GKE Resource Created from the Internet ( Preview )
GKE_RESOURCE_CREATED_ANONYMOUSLY_FROM_INTERNET
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs .
A resource was created by an effectively anonymous internet user . Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Initial Access: GKE Resource Modified Anonymously from the Internet ( Preview )
GKE_RESOURCE_MODIFIED_ANONYMOUSLY_FROM_INTERNET
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
A resource was manipulated by an effectively anonymous internet user . Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Effectively Anonymous Users Granted GKE Cluster Access
GKE_ANONYMOUS_USERS_GRANTED_ACCESS
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs

Someone created an RBAC binding that references one of the following users or groups:

  • system:anonymous
  • system:unauthenticated
  • system:authenticated

These users and groups are effectively anonymous and should be avoided when creating role bindings or cluster role bindings to any RBAC roles. Review the binding to ensure that it is necessary. If the binding isn't necessary, remove it. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.

Execution: Suspicious Exec or Attach to a System Pod ( Preview )
GKE_SUSPICIOUS_EXEC_ATTACH
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone used the exec or attach commands to get a shell or execute a command on a container running in the kube-system namespace. These methods are sometimes used for legitimate debugging purposes. However, the kube-system namespace is intended for system objects created by Kubernetes, and unexpected command execution or shell creation should be reviewed. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Workload Created with a Sensitive Host Path Mount ( Preview )
GKE_SENSITIVE_HOSTPATH
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone created a workload that contains a hostPath volume mount to a sensitive path on the host node's file system. Access to these paths on the host filesystem can be used to access privileged or sensitive information on the node and for container escapes. If possible, don't allow any hostPath volumes in your cluster. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Workload with shareProcessNamespace enabled ( Preview )
GKE_SHAREPROCESSNAMESPACE_POD
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone deployed a workload with the shareProcessNamespace option set to true , allowing all containers to share the same Linux process namespace. This could allow an untrusted or compromised container to escalate privileges by accessing and controlling environment variables, memory, and other sensitive data from processes running in other containers. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: ClusterRole with Privileged Verbs ( Preview )
GKE_CLUSTERROLE_PRIVILEGED_VERBS
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone created an RBAC ClusterRole that contains the bind , escalate , or impersonate verbs. A subject that's bound to a role with these verbs can impersonate other users with higher privileges, bind to additional Roles or ClusterRoles that contain additional permissions, or modify their own ClusterRole permissions. This might lead to those subjects gaining cluster-admin privileges. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: ClusterRoleBinding to Privileged Role
GKE_CRB_CLUSTERROLE_AGGREGATION_CONTROLLER
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone created an RBAC ClusterRoleBinding that references the default system:controller:clusterrole-aggregation-controller ClusterRole . This default ClusterRole has the escalate verb, which allows subjects to modify the privileges of their own roles, allowing for privilege escalation. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Defense Evasion: Manually Deleted Certificate Signing Request (CSR)
GKE_MANUALLY_DELETED_CSR
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone manually deleted a certificate signing request (CSR). CSRs are automatically removed by a garbage collection controller, but malicious actors might manually delete them to evade detection. If the deleted CSR was for an approved and issued certificate, the potentially malicious actor now has an additional authentication method to access the cluster. The permissions associated with the certificate vary depending on which subject they included, but can be highly privileged. Kubernetes does not support certificate revocation. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Credential Access: Failed Attempt to Approve Kubernetes Certificate Signing Request (CSR)
GKE_APPROVE_CSR_FORBIDDEN
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone attempted to manually approve a certificate signing request (CSR) but the action failed. Creating a certificate for cluster authentication is a common method for attackers to create persistent access to a compromised cluster. The permissions associated with the certificate vary depending on which subject they included, but can be highly privileged. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Credential Access: Manually Approved Kubernetes Certificate Signing Request (CSR) ( Preview )
GKE_CSR_APPROVED
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone manually approved a certificate signing request (CSR). Creating a certificate for cluster authentication is a common method for attackers to create persistent access to a compromised cluster. The permissions associated with the certificate vary depending on which subject they included, but can be highly privileged. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Execution: Kubernetes Pod Created with Potential Reverse Shell Arguments
GKE_REVERSE_SHELL_POD
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone created a Pod that contains commands or arguments that are commonly associated with a reverse shell . Attackers use reverse shells to expand or maintain their initial access to a cluster and to execute arbitrary commands. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Defense Evasion: Potential Kubernetes Pod Masquerading
GKE_POD_MASQUERADING
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone deployed a Pod with a naming convention that is similar to the default workloads that GKE creates for regular cluster operation. This technique is called masquerading . Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Kubernetes Container Names - Exploitation and Escape ( Preview )
GKE_SUSPICIOUS_EXPLOIT_POD
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone deployed a Pod with a naming convention that is similar to common tools used for container escapes or to execute other attacks on the cluster. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Persistence: Service Account Created in sensitive namespace
GKE_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_CREATION_SENSITIVE_NAMESPACE
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone created a service account in a sensitive namespace. The kube-system and kube-public namespaces are critical for GKE cluster operations, and unauthorized service accounts could compromise cluster stability and security. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Impact: Suspicious Kubernetes Container Names - Cryptocurrency Mining
GKE_SUSPICIOUS_CRYPTOMINING_POD
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone deployed a Pod with a naming convention that is similar to common cryptocurrency coin miners. This may be an attempt by an attacker who has achieved initial access to the cluster to use the cluster's resources for cryptocurrency mining. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Execution: Workload triggered in sensitive namespace
GKE_SENSITIVE_NAMESPACE_WORKLOAD_TRIGGERED
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone deployed a workload (for example, a Pod or Deployment) in the kube-system or kube-public namespaces. These namespaces are critical for GKE cluster operations, and unauthorized workloads could compromise cluster stability or security. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Execution: GKE launch excessively capable container ( Preview )
GKE_EXCESSIVELY_CAPABLE_CONTAINER_CREATED
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone created a container with one or more of the following capabilities in a cluster with an elevated security context:
  • CAP_SYS_MODULE
  • CAP_SYS_RAWIO
  • CAP_SYS_PTRACE
  • CAP_SYS_BOOT
  • CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
  • CAP_NET_ADMIN
  • CAP_BPF
These capabilities can be used to escape from containers. Use caution when provisioning these capabilities. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Persistence: GKE Webhook Configuration Detected
GKE_WEBHOOK_CONFIG_CREATED
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
A webhook configuration was detected in your GKE cluster. Webhooks can intercept and modify Kubernetes API requests, potentially allowing attackers to persist within your cluster or manipulate resources. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Defense Evasion: Static Pod Created
GKE_STATIC_POD_CREATED
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone created a static Pod in your GKE cluster. Static Pods run directly on the node and bypass the Kubernetes API server, which makes them more difficult to monitor and control. Attackers can use static Pods to evade detection or maintain persistence. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Initial Access: Successful API call made from a TOR proxy IP
GKE_TOR_PROXY_IP_REQUEST
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
A successful API call was made to your GKE cluster from an IP address associated with the Tor network. Tor provides anonymity, which attackers often exploit to hide their identity. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Initial Access: GKE NodePort service created
GKE_NODEPORT_SERVICE_CREATED
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone created a NodePort service. NodePort services expose Pods directly on a node's IP address and static port, which make the Pods accessible from outside the cluster. This can introduce a significant security risk because it could allow an attacker to exploit vulnerabilities in the exposed service to gain access to the cluster or sensitive data. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Impact: GKE kube-dns modification detected ( Preview )
GKE_KUBE_DNS_MODIFICATION
Cloud Audit Logs :
GKE Admin Activity logs
Someone modified the kube-dns configuration in your GKE cluster. GKE kube-dns is a critical component of your cluster's networking, and its misconfiguration could lead to a security breach. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
Impact: Cryptomining Commands
CLOUD_RUN_JOBS_CRYPTOMINING_COMMANDS
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM System Event audit logs
Specific cryptomining commands were attached to a Cloud Run job during execution. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Execution: Cryptomining Docker Image
CLOUD_RUN_CRYPTOMINING_DOCKER_IMAGES
Cloud Audit Logs :
IAM System Event audit logs
Specific known bad docker images were attached to a new or existing Cloud Run service or job. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Privilege Escalation: Default Compute Engine Service Account SetIAMPolicy
CLOUD_RUN_SERVICES_SET_IAM_POLICY
Cloud Audit Logs :
Admin Activity logs
The default Compute Engine service account was used to set the IAM policy for a Cloud Run service. This is a potential post exploit action when a Compute Engine token is compromised from a serverless service. Findings are classified as Lowseverity by default.
Initial Access: CloudDB Successful login from Anonymizing Proxy IP
CLOUD_DB_LOGIN_SUCCEEDED_ANON_IP
Cloud Audit Logs : AlloyDB for PostgreSQL data access logs
Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL data access logs
Cloud SQL for MySQL data access logs
Note : You must enable IP logging in PostgreSQL to use this rule for AlloyDB and Postgres.
A successful login was detected in your database instance from a known anonymizing IP address. This could indicate an attacker gaining initial access to your instance. Findings are classified as Highseverity by default.
Credential Access: CloudDB Failed login from Anonymizing Proxy IP
CLOUD_DB_LOGIN_FAILED_ANON_IP
Cloud Audit Logs : AlloyDB for PostgreSQL data access logs
Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL data access logs
Cloud SQL for MySQL data access logs
Note : You must enable IP logging in PostgreSQL to use this rule for AlloyDB and Postgres.
A failed login was detected in your database instance from a known anonymizing IP address. This could indicate an attacker attempting unauthorized access to your instance. Findings are classified as Mediumseverity by default.
For deprecated and shut down rules, see Deprecations .

Custom modules for Event Threat Detection

In addition to built-in detection rules, Event Threat Detection provides module templates that you can use to create custom detection rules. For more information, see Overview of custom modules for Event Threat Detection .

To create detection rules for which no custom module templates are available, you can export your log data to BigQuery , and then run unique or recurring SQL queries that capture your threat models.

Unsafe Google Group changes

This section explains how Event Threat Detection uses Google Workspace logs, Cloud Audit Logs, and IAM policies to detect unsafe Google Groups changes. Detecting Google Groups changes is only supported when you activate Security Command Center at the organization level.

Google Cloud customers can use Google groups to manage roles and permissions for members in their organizations, or apply access policies to collections of users. Instead of granting roles directly to members, administrators can grant roles and permissions to Google Groups, and then add members to specific groups. Group members inherit all of a group's roles and permissions, which lets members access specific resources and services.

While Google Groups are a convenient way to manage access control at scale, they can pose a risk if external users from outside your organization or domain are added to privileged groups—groups that are granted sensitive roles or permissions . Sensitive roles control access to security and network settings, logs, and personally identifiable information (PII), and are not recommended for external group members.

In large organizations, administrators might not be aware when external members are added to privileged groups. Cloud Audit Logs record role grants to groups, but those log events don't contain information on group members, which can obscure the potential impact of some group changes.

If you share your Google Workspace logs with Google Cloud, Event Threat Detection monitors your logging streams for new members added to your organization's Google Groups. Because the logs are at the organization level, Event Threat Detection can scan Google Workspace logs only when you activate Security Command Center at the organization level. Event Threat Detection can't scan these logs when you activate Security Command Center at the project level.

Event Threat Detection identifies external group members and, using Cloud Audit Logs, reviews each affected group's IAM roles to check whether the groups are granted sensitive roles. That information is used to detect the following unsafe changes for privileged Google Groups:

  • External group members added to privileged groups
  • Sensitive roles or permissions granted to groups with external group members
  • Privileged groups that are changed to allow anyone in the general public to join

Event Threat Detection writes findings to Security Command Center. Findings contain the email addresses of newly added external members, internal group members that initiate events, group names, and the sensitive roles associated with groups. You can use the information to remove external members from groups or revoke sensitive roles granted to groups.

For more information on Event Threat Detection findings, see Event Threat Detection rules .

Sensitive IAM roles and permissions

This section explains how Event Threat Detection defines sensitive IAM roles. Detections like IAM Anomalous Grant and Unsafe Google Group changes generate findings only if changes involve high- or medium-sensitivity roles. The sensitivity of roles impacts the severity rating assigned to findings.

  • High-sensitivity roles control critical services in organizations, including billing, firewall settings, and logging. Findings that match these roles are classified as Highseverity.
  • Medium-sensitivity roles have editing permissions that let principals make changes to Google Cloud resources; and viewing and executing permissions on data storage services that often hold sensitive data. The severity assigned to findings depends on the resource:
    • If medium-sensitivity roles are granted at the organization level, findings are classified as Highseverity.
    • If medium-sensitivity roles are granted at lower levels in your resource hierarchy (folders, projects, and buckets, among others), findings are classified as Mediumseverity.

Granting these sensitive roles is considered dangerous if the grantee is an External Member or an abnormal identity, like a principal that has been inactive for a long time.

Granting sensitive roles to external members creates a potential threat because they can be abused for account compromise and data exfiltration.

Finding categories that use these sensitive roles include:

  • Persistence: IAM Anomalous Grant
    • Subrule: external_service_account_added_to_policy
    • Subrule: external_member_added_to_policy
  • Privilege Escalation: Sensitive Role Granted To Hybrid Group
  • Privilege Escalation: Dormant Service Account Granted Sensitive Role

Finding categories that use a subset of the sensitive roles include:

  • Persistence: IAM Anomalous Grant
    • Subrule: service_account_granted_sensitive_role_to_member

The service_account_granted_sensitive_role_to_member subrule targets both external and internal members generally and therefore uses only a subset of sensitive roles, as explained in Event Threat Detection rules .

Category
Role
Description
Basic roles : contain thousands of permissions across all Google Cloud services.
roles/owner
roles/editor
Security roles : control access to security settings
roles/cloudkms.*
roles/cloudsecurityscanner.*
roles/iam.*
roles/secretmanager.*
roles/securitycenter.*
Logging roles : control access to an organization's logs
roles/errorreporting.*
roles/logging.*
roles/stackdriver.*
Personal information roles : control access to resources that contain personally identifiable information, including banking and contact information
roles/billing.*
roles/healthcare.*
roles/essentialcontacts.*
Networking roles : control access to an organization's network settings
roles/dns.*
roles/domains.*
roles/networkconnectivity.*
roles/networkmanagement.*
roles/privateca.*
Service roles : control access to service resources in Google Cloud
roles/cloudasset.*
roles/servicedirectory.*
roles/servicemanagement.*
roles/servicenetworking.*
roles/serviceusage.*
Compute Engine roles : control access to Compute Engine virtual machines, which carry long-running jobs and are associated with firewall rules

roles/compute.admin

roles/compute.instanceAdmin

roles/compute.instanceAdmin.v1

roles/compute.loadBalancerAdmin

roles/compute.networkAdmin

roles/compute.orgFirewallPolicyAdmin

roles/compute.orgFirewallPolicyUser

roles/compute.orgSecurityPolicyAdmin

roles/compute.orgSecurityPolicyUser

roles/compute.orgSecurityResourceAdmin

roles/compute.osAdminLogin

roles/compute.publicIpAdmin

roles/compute.securityAdmin

roles/compute.storageAdmin

roles/compute.xpnAdmin

All Compute Engine Admin and Editor roles
Category
Role
Description
Editing roles : IAM roles that include permissions to make changes to Google Cloud resources

Examples:

roles/storage.objectAdmin

roles/file.editor

roles/source.writer

roles/container.developer

Role names usually end with titles like Admin , Owner , Editor , or Writer .

Expand the node in the last row of the table to see All medium-sensitivity roles

Data storage roles : IAM roles that include permissions to view and execute data storage services

Examples:

roles/cloudsql.viewer

roles/cloudsql.client

roles/bigquery.dataViewer

roles/bigquery.user

roles/spanner.databaseReader

roles/spanner.databaseUser

Expand the node in the last row of the table to see All medium-sensitivity roles
All medium-sensitivity roles

Access Approval

  • roles/accessapproval.approver
  • roles/accessapproval.configEditor

Access Context Manager

  • roles/accesscontextmanager.gcpAccessAdmin
  • roles/accesscontextmanager.policyAdmin
  • roles/accesscontextmanager.policyEditor

Actions

  • roles/actions.Admin

AI Platform

  • roles/ml.admin
  • roles/ml.developer
  • roles/ml.jobOwner
  • roles/ml.modelOwner
  • roles/ml.modelUser

API Gateway

  • roles/apigateway.admin

App Engine

  • roles/appengine.appAdmin
  • roles/appengine.appCreator
  • roles/appengine.serviceAdmin

AutoML

  • roles/automl.admin
  • roles/automl.editor

BigQuery

  • roles/bigquery.admin
  • roles/bigquery.dataEditor
  • roles/bigquery.dataOwner
  • roles/bigquery.dataViewer
  • roles/bigquery.resourceAdmin
  • roles/bigquery.resourceEditor
  • roles/bigquery.resourceViewer
  • roles/bigquery.user

Binary Authorization

  • roles/binaryauthorization.attestorsAdmin
  • roles/binaryauthorization.attestorsEditor
  • roles/binaryauthorization.policyAdmin
  • roles/binaryauthorization.policyEditor

Bigtable

  • roles/bigtable.admin
  • roles/bigtable.reader
  • roles/bigtable.user

Cloud Build

  • roles/cloudbuild.builds.builder
  • roles/cloudbuild.builds.editor

Cloud Deployment Manager

  • roles/deploymentmanager.editor
  • roles/deploymentmanager.typeEditor

Cloud Endpoints

  • roles/endpoints.portalAdmin Beta

Cloud Run functions

  • roles/cloudfunctions.admin
  • roles/cloudfunctions.developer
  • roles/cloudfunctions.invoker

Cloud IoT

  • roles/cloudiot.admin
  • roles/cloudiot.deviceController
  • roles/cloudiot.editor
  • roles/cloudiot.provisioner

Cloud Life Sciences

  • roles/genomics.admin
  • roles/genomics.admin
  • roles/lifesciences.admin
  • roles/lifesciences.editor

Cloud Monitoring

  • roles/monitoring.admin
  • roles/monitoring.alertPolicyEditor
  • roles/monitoring.dashboardEditor
  • roles/monitoring.editor
  • roles/monitoring.metricWriter
  • roles/monitoring.notificationChannelEditor
  • roles/monitoring.servicesEditor
  • roles/monitoring.uptimeCheckConfigEditor

Cloud Run

  • roles/run.admin
  • roles/run.developer

Cloud Scheduler

  • roles/cloudscheduler.admin

Cloud Source Repositories

  • roles/source.admin
  • roles/source.writer

Spanner

  • roles/spanner.admin
  • roles/spanner.backupAdmin
  • roles/spanner.backupWriter
  • roles/spanner.databaseAdmin
  • roles/spanner.restoreAdmin
  • roles/spanner.databaseReader
  • roles/spanner.databaseUser

Cloud Storage

  • roles/storage.admin
  • roles/storage.hmacKeyAdmin
  • roles/storage.objectAdmin
  • roles/storage.objectCreator
  • roles/storage.objectViewer
  • roles/storage.legacyBucketOwner
  • roles/storage.legacyBucketWriter
  • roles/storage.legacyBucketReader
  • roles/storage.legacyObjectOwner
  • roles/storage.legacyObjectReader

Cloud SQL

  • roles/cloudsql.admin
  • roles/cloudsql.editor
  • roles/cloudsql.client
  • roles/cloudsql.instanceUser
  • roles/cloudsql.viewer

Cloud Tasks

  • roles/cloudtasks.admin
  • roles/cloudtasks.enqueuer
  • roles/cloudtasks.queueAdmin
  • roles/cloudtasks.taskDeleter

Cloud TPU

  • tpu.admin

Cloud Trace

  • roles/cloudtrace.admin
  • roles/cloudtrace.agent

Compute Engine

  • roles/compute.imageUser
  • roles/compute.osLoginExternalUser
  • roles/osconfig.guestPolicyAdmin
  • roles/osconfig.guestPolicyEditor
  • roles/osconfig.osPolicyAssignmentAdmin
  • roles/osconfig.osPolicyAssignmentEditor
  • roles/osconfig.patchDeploymentAdmin

Artifact Analysis

  • roles/containeranalysis.admin
  • roles/containeranalysis.notes.attacher
  • roles/containeranalysis.notes.editor
  • roles/containeranalysis.occurrences.editor

Data Catalog

  • roles/datacatalog.admin
  • roles/datacatalog.categoryAdmin
  • roles/datacatalog.entryGroupCreator
  • roles/datacatalog.entryGroupOwner
  • roles/datacatalog.entryOwner

Dataflow

  • roles/dataflow.admin
  • roles/dataflow.developer

Dataproc

  • roles/dataproc.admin
  • roles/dataproc.editor

Dataproc Metastore

  • roles/metastore.admin
  • roles/metastore.editor

Datastore

  • roles/datastore.importExportAdmin
  • roles/datastore.indexAdmin
  • roles/datastore.owner
  • roles/datastore.user

Eventarc

  • roles/eventarc.admin
  • roles/eventarc.developer
  • roles/eventarc.eventReceiver

Filestore

  • roles/file.editor

Firebase

  • roles/firebase.admin
  • roles/firebase.analyticsAdmin
  • roles/firebase.developAdmin
  • roles/firebase.growthAdmin
  • roles/firebase.qualityAdmin
  • roles/firebaseabt.admin
  • roles/firebaseappcheck.admin
  • roles/firebaseappdistro.admin
  • roles/firebaseauth.admin
  • roles/firebasecrashlytics.admin
  • roles/firebasedatabase.admin
  • roles/firebasedynamiclinks.admin
  • roles/firebasehosting.admin
  • roles/firebaseinappmessaging.admin
  • roles/firebaseml.admin
  • roles/firebasenotifications.admin
  • roles/firebaseperformance.admin
  • roles/firebasepredictions.admin
  • roles/firebaserules.admin
  • roles/firebasestorage.admin
  • roles/cloudconfig.admin
  • roles/cloudtestservice.testAdmin

Game Servers

  • roles/gameservices.admin

Google Cloud VMware Engine

  • vmwareengine.vmwareengineAdmin

Google Kubernetes Engine

  • roles/container.admin
  • roles/container.clusterAdmin
  • roles/container.developer

Google Kubernetes Engine Hub

  • roles/gkehub.admin
  • roles/gkehub.gatewayAdmin
  • roles/gkehub.connect

Google Workspace

  • roles/gsuiteaddons.developer

Identity-Aware Proxy

  • roles/iap.admin
  • roles/iap.settingsAdmin

Managed Service for Microsoft Active Directory

  • roles/managedidentities.admin
  • roles/managedidentities.domainAdmin
  • roles/managedidentities.viewer

Memorystore for Redis

  • roles/redis.admin
  • roles/redis.editor

On-Demand Scanning API

  • roles/ondemandscanning.admin

Ops Config Monitoring

  • roles/opsconfigmonitoring.resourceMetadata.writer

Organization Policy Service

  • roles/axt.admin
  • roles/orgpolicy.policyAdmin

Other roles

  • roles/autoscaling.metricsWriter
  • roles/autoscaling.sitesAdmin
  • roles/autoscaling.stateWriter
  • roles/chroniclesm.admin
  • roles/dataprocessing.admin
  • roles/earlyaccesscenter.admin
  • roles/firebasecrash.symbolMappingsAdmin
  • roles/identityplatform.admin
  • roles/identitytoolkit.admin
  • roles/oauthconfig.editor
  • roles/retail.admin
  • roles/retail.editor
  • roles/runtimeconfig.admin

Proximity Beacon

  • roles/proximitybeacon.attachmentEditor
  • roles/proximitybeacon.beaconEditor

Pub/Sub

  • roles/pubsub.admin
  • roles/pubsub.editor

Pub/Sub Lite

  • roles/pubsublite.admin
  • roles/pubsublite.editor
  • roles/pubsublite.publisher

reCAPTCHA

  • roles/recaptchaenterprise.admin
  • roles/recaptchaenterprise.agent

Recommendations

  • roles/automlrecommendations.admin
  • roles/automlrecommendations.editor

Recommender

  • roles/recommender.billingAccountCudAdmin
  • roles/recommender.cloudAssetInsightsAdmin
  • roles/recommender.cloudsqlAdmin
  • roles/recommender.computeAdmin
  • roles/recommender.firewallAdmin
  • roles/recommender.iamAdmin
  • roles/recommender.productSuggestionAdmin
  • roles/recommender.projectCudAdmin

Resource Manager

  • roles/resourcemanager.folderAdmin
  • roles/resourcemanager.folderCreator
  • roles/resourcemanager.folderEditor
  • roles/resourcemanager.folderIamAdmin
  • roles/resourcemanager.folderMover
  • roles/resourcemanager.lienModifier
  • roles/resourcemanager.organizationAdmin
  • roles/resourcemanager.projectCreator
  • roles/resourcemanager.projectDeleter
  • roles/resourcemanager.projectIamAdmin
  • roles/resourcemanager.projectMover
  • roles/resourcemanager.tagAdmin

Resource Settings

  • roles/resourcesettings.admin

Serverless VPC Access

  • roles/vpcaccess.admin

Service Consumer Management

  • roles/serviceconsumermanagement.tenancyUnitsAdmin

Storage Transfer Service

  • roles/storagetransfer.admin
  • roles/storagetransfer.user

Vertex AI

  • roles/aiplatform.admin
  • roles/aiplatform.featurestoreAdmin
  • roles/aiplatform.migrator
  • roles/aiplatform.user

Vertex AI Workbench user-managed notebooks

  • roles/notebooks.admin
  • roles/notebooks.legacyAdmin

Workflows

  • roles/workflows.admin
  • roles/workflows.editor

Log types and activation requirements

This section lists the logs that Event Threat Detection uses, along with the threats that Event Threat Detection looks for in each log, and what, if anything, you need to do to turn on each log.

You need to turn a log on for Event Threat Detection only if all of the following are true:

  • You are using the product or service that writes to the log.
  • You need to protect the product or service against the threats that Event Threat Detection detects in the log.
  • The log is a data access audit log or other log that is off by default.

Certain threats can be detected in multiple logs. If Event Threat Detection can detect a threat in a log that is already turned on, you don't need to turn on another log to detect that same threat.

If a log isn't listed in this section, Event Threat Detection does not scan it, even if it is turned on. For more information, see Potentially redundant log scans .

As described in the following table , some log types are only available at the organization level. If you activate Security Command Center at the project level, Event Threat Detection doesn't scan these logs and doesn't produce any findings.

Foundational log sources

Event Threat Detection uses foundational data sources to detect potentially malicious activities in your network.

  • If you enable Event Threat Detection without VPC Flow Logs, Event Threat Detection immediately starts analyzing an independent, duplicate, and internal stream of VPC Flow Logs. To further investigate an existing Event Threat Detection finding, you need to enable VPC Flow Logs and manually navigate to Logs Explorer and Flow Analyzer. If you enable VPC Flow Logs at a later date, only future findings will contain the relevant links for further investigation.

  • If you enable Event Threat Detection with VPC Flow Logs, Event Threat Detection immediately starts analyzing the VPC Flow Logs in your deployment and provides links to Logs Explorer and Flow Analyzer to help you investigate further.

Logs for network detection of malware

Event Threat Detection can provide network detection of malware by scanning any one of the following logs:

  • Cloud DNS logging
  • Cloud NAT logging
  • Firewall Rules Logging
  • VPC Flow Logs

You don't need to enable more than one of Cloud NAT logging, Firewall Rules Logging, or VPC Flow Logs.

If you are already using Cloud DNS logging, Event Threat Detection can detect malware using domain resolution. For most users, the Cloud DNS logs are sufficient for the network detection of malware.

If you need another level of visibility beyond domain resolution, you can turn on VPC Flow Logs, but VPC Flow Logs can incur costs. To manage these costs, we recommend increasing the aggregation interval to 15 minutes and reducing the sample rate to between 5% and 10%, but there is a tradeoff between recall (higher sample) and cost management (lower sample rate). For more information, see Log sampling and processing .

If you are already using Firewall Rules Logging or Cloud NAT logging, these logs are useful in place of VPC Flow Logs.

Supported log data and threats detected

This section lists the Cloud Logging and Google Workspace logs that you can turn on or otherwise configure to increase the number of threats that Event Threat Detection can detect.

Certain threats, such as threats posed by the anomalous impersonation or delegation of a service account, can be found in most audit logs. For these types of threats, you determine which logs you need to turn on based on the products and services you are using.

The following table shows specific logs you can enable and the type of threats that can be detected.

Log type
Threats detected
Configuration required

Log4j Malware: Bad Domain

Malware: bad domain

Malware: Cryptomining Bad Domain

Log4j Malware: Bad IP

Malware: bad IP

Malware: Cryptomining Bad IP

Log4j Malware: Bad IP

Malware: bad IP

Malware: Cryptomining Bad IP

Discovery: Can get sensitive Kubernetes object check

Privilege Escalation: Get Kubernetes CSR with compromised bootstrap credentials

Persistence: SSO Enablement Toggle

Persistence: SSO Settings Changed

Persistence: Strong Authentication Disabled

Persistence: Two Step Verification Disabled

Privilege Escalation: Privileged Group Opened To Public

Share Google Workspace Admin Audit logs with Cloud Logging

This log type can't be scanned in project-level activations.

Credential Access: External Member Added To Privileged Group

Initial Access: Account Disabled Hijacked

Initial Access: Disabled Password Leak

Initial Access: Government Based Attack

Initial Access: Suspicious Login Blocked

Persistence: Two Step Verification Disabled

Share Google Workspace Login Audit logs with Cloud Logging

This log type can't be scanned in project-level activations.

Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Data Exfiltration

Initial Access: CloudDB Successful login from Anonymizing Proxy IP

Credential Access: CloudDB Failed login from Anonymizing Proxy IP

Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Data Exfiltration

Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Over-Privileged Grant

Initial Access: CloudDB Successful login from Anonymizing Proxy IP

Credential Access: CloudDB Failed login from Anonymizing Proxy IP

Privilege Escalation: AlloyDB Database Superuser Writes to User Tables

Privilege Escalation: AlloyDB Over-Privileged Grant

Initial Access: CloudDB Successful login from Anonymizing Proxy IP

Credential Access: CloudDB Failed login from Anonymizing Proxy IP

Initial Access: Leaked Service Account Key Used

Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Multistep Service Account Delegation for AI Data Access

Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Multistep Service Account Delegation for Data Access

Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Service Account Impersonator for AI Data Access

Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Service Account Impersonator for Data Access

Brute force SSH
Install the Ops Agent or the legacy Logging agent on your VM hosts

Log4j Malware: Bad IP

Malware: bad IP

Malware: Cryptomining Bad IP

Logs that are always on

The following table lists the Cloud Logging logs that you don't need to turn on or configure. These logs are always on and Event Threat Detection scans them automatically.

Log type Threats detected Configuration required

Exfiltration: BigQuery Data Exfiltration

Exfiltration: BigQuery Data Extraction

Exfiltration: BigQuery Data to Google Drive

Exfiltration: Move to Public BigQuery resource ( Preview )

None

Credential Access: Failed Attempt to Approve Kubernetes Certificate Signing Request (CSR)

Credential Access: Manually Approved Kubernetes Certificate Signing Request (CSR) ( Preview )

Defense Evasion: Anonymous Sessions Granted Cluster Admin Access

Defense Evasion: Manually Deleted Certificate Signing Request (CSR)

Defense Evasion: Potential Kubernetes Pod Masquerading

Defense Evasion: Static Pod Created

Execution: GKE launch excessively capable container ( Preview )

Execution: Kubernetes Pod Created with Potential Reverse Shell Arguments

Execution: Suspicious Exec or Attach to a System Pod ( Preview )

Execution: Workload triggered in sensitive namespace

Impact: GKE kube-dns modification detected ( Preview )

Impact: Suspicious Kubernetes Container Names - Cryptocurrency Mining

Initial Access: Anonymous GKE Resource Created from the Internet ( Preview )

Initial Access: GKE NodePort service created

Initial Access: GKE Resource Modified Anonymously from the Internet ( Preview )

Initial Access: Successful API call made from a TOR proxy IP

Persistence: GKE Webhook Configuration Detected

Persistence: Service Account Created in sensitive namespace

Privilege Escalation: Changes to sensitive Kubernetes RBAC objects

Privilege Escalation: ClusterRole with Privileged Verbs ( Preview )

Privilege Escalation: ClusterRoleBinding to Privileged Role

Privilege Escalation: Create Kubernetes CSR for master cert

Privilege Escalation: Creation of sensitive Kubernetes bindings

Privilege Escalation: Effectively Anonymous Users Granted GKE Cluster Access

Privilege Escalation: Launch of privileged Kubernetes container

Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Kubernetes Container Names - Exploitation and Escape ( Preview )

Privilege Escalation: Workload Created with a Sensitive Host Path Mount ( Preview )

Privilege Escalation: Workload with shareProcessNamespace enabled ( Preview )

None

Persistence: IAM Anomalous Grant ( Preview )

Persistence: Unmanaged Account Granted Sensitive Role

Privilege Escalation: Default Compute Engine Service Account SetIAMPolicy

Privilege Escalation: Dormant Service Account Granted Sensitive Role

Privilege Escalation: Impersonation Role Granted For Dormant Service Account

Privilege Escalation: Sensitive Role Granted To Hybrid Group

None
Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Restore Backup to External Organization None
Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Restore Backup to External Organization None
Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Restore Backup to External Organization None

Defense Evasion: GCS Bucket IP Filtering Modified

Defense Evasion: Project HTTP Policy Block Disabled

Initial Access: Dormant Service Account Action

Initial Access: Dormant Service Account Activity in AI Service

Initial Access: Dormant Service Account Key Created

Initial Access: Excessive Permission Denied Actions

Initial Access: Leaked Service Account Key Used

Lateral Movement: Modified Boot Disk Attached to Instance ( Preview )

Persistence: GCE Admin Added SSH Key

Persistence: GCE Admin Added Startup Script

Persistence: New AI API Method

Persistence: New API Method

Persistence: New Geography

Persistence: New Geography for AI Service

Persistence: New User Agent

Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Impersonation of Service Account for Admin Activity

Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Impersonation of Service Account for AI Admin Activity

Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Multistep Service Account Delegation for Admin Activity

Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Multistep Service Account Delegation for AI Admin Activity

Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Service Account Impersonator for Admin Activity

Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Service Account Impersonator for AI Admin Activity

None
Defense Evasion: Modify VPC Service Control ( Preview ) None

Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR expire all images

Impact: Deleted Google Cloud Backup and DR Backup

Impact: Deleted Google Cloud Backup and DR host

Impact: Deleted Google Cloud Backup and DR plan association

Impact: Deleted Google Cloud Backup and DR Vault

Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete policy

Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete profile

Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete template

Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR expire image

Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR reduce backup expiration

Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR reduce backup frequency

Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR remove appliance

Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR remove plan

Inhibit system recovery: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete storage pool

None

Execution: Cryptomining Docker Image

Impact: Cryptomining Commands

None

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