丸亀製麺

Reminiscences

Reminiscences

The game of speculation is the most uniformly fascinating game in the world.

株投機は世界で最も魅力的なゲームだ。 しかし怠惰な人、感情をコントロールできない人、それに手っ取り早く儲けようなどと思っている人は、絶対に利益を上げることはできない。 The game of speculation is the most uniformly fascinating game in the world. But it is not a game for the stupid, the mentally lazy, the man of inferior emotional balance, or for the get-rich-quick adventurer. They will die poor.

There is nothing like losing all you have in the world for teaching you what not to do.

すべきではないことを学ぶには、持てるもの一切合切を失うというのが一番だ。 金を失わないためには何をすべきでないかが分かった時、 相場で勝つのに何をすべきかということが、ようやくわかり始めるのだ。 There is nothing like losing all you have in the world for teaching you what not to do. And when you know what not to do in order not to lose money, you begin to learn what to do in order to win.

A trader gets to play the game as the professional billiard player does--

トレーダーの相場に挑む態度はプロのビリヤードプレーヤーと同じで、 目先の１ショットではなく、はるか全体を見渡してプレーするのだ。 どのポジションをとるかを考えながらプレーするのはプロにとって習性だ。 A trader gets to play the game as the professional billiard player does--that is, he looks far ahead instead of considering the particular shot before him. It gets to be an instinct to play for position.

誤った時にすべきことはただ１つ、改めることだ。

and the only thing to do when a man is wrong is to be right by ceasing to be wrong.

損が明らかな時には損切り、利益が見込める時には利喰わないのが鉄則だ。

 Always sell what shows you a loss and keep what shows you a profit.

おれが手痛い目にあうのは常に、おれの方針

－つまり過去の例からすると自分の判断が正しいと自身を持ってゲームに臨める時にしか相場に入らないという方針－を守ることができない時だった。 What beat me was not having brains enough to stick to my own game- that is, to play the market only when I was satisfied that precedents favored my play.

良いアイディアが相場で大きな利益を上げる秘訣ではない。

 最も重要なのは、絶好の時が来るまで静かに座っていることだ。 It never was my thinking that made the big money for me. It always was my sitting. Got that? My sitting tight! It is no trick at all to be right on the market.

株というものは、

買い始めるのに高すぎるということはないし、売り始めるのに安すぎるということはない。 しかし、最初の建玉で利益があがらないかぎりは、続けての建玉は手控えるべきだ。 よく状況を見極めて待つことだ。 stocks are never too high for you to begin buying or too low to begin selling. But after the initial transaction, don't make a second unless the first shows you a profit. Wait and watch.

明白なのは強気相場では強気筋、弱気相場では弱気筋になれということだ。

Obviously the thing to do was to be bullish in a bull market and bearish in a bear market

自分の失敗すべてから教訓を学ぶには長い時間がかかる。

自分の失敗すべてから教訓を学ぶには長い時間がかかる。 物事には二面性があるとよくいうが、相場ではたた１つのことがあるだけだ。 強気か弱気かでもはない。正しいか否かということなのだ。 It takes a man a long time to learn all the lessons of all his mistakes. They say there are two sides to everything. But there is only one side to the stock market; and it is not the bull side or the bear side, but the right side.

投機家の最大の敵は自分の中にいる。 人間の本性として、人は希望と恐れとは無縁ではいられない。

The speculator's chief enemies are always boring from within. It is inseparable from human nature to hope and to fear.

株の選び方 すばらしい

きっと、あなたが選ぶのは、誠実で、思いやりがあって、自分の行ったことを人の手柄に出来る、そんな人格を持った、信頼に足る人となるのではないだろうか？

According to my dope Sugar should have broken 103 by now.

The engine wasn't hitting right. I had the feeling that there was a trap in the neighborhood. At all events, the telegraph instrument was now going like mad and I noticed that Tom Burnham, the clerk, had left my tickets unmarked where I laid them, and was listening to the clicking as if he were waiting for something. So I yelled at him: "Hey, Tom, what in hell are you waiting for? Mark the price on these tickets — 103! Get a gait on!"

He said he would, and I got up and gave him my place

by the ticker so he could call out the prices for the boy. I took my seven Sugar tickets out of my pocket and walked over to the counter, to where the clerk was who marked the tickets when you closed your trades. But I didn't really know why I should get out of the market, so I just stood there, leaning against the counter, my tickets in my hand so that the clerk couldn't see them. Pretty soon I heard the clicking of a telegraph instrument and I saw Tom Burnham, the clerk, turn his head quickly and listen. Then I felt that something crooked was hatching, and I decided not to wait any longer. Just then Dave Wyman by the ticker, began: "Su " and quick as a flash I slapped my tickets on the counter in front of the clerk and yelled, "Close Sugar!" before Dave had finished calling the price. So, of course, the house had to close my Sugar at the last quotation. What Dave called turned out to be 103 again.

会社でチャンスをつかむ人が実行している本当のルール

会社でチャンスをつかむ人が実行している本当のルール

マイケル・マーカス

Q君ほど大成功したトレーダーはあまりいないけど、他の人とどこが違うと思う。僕は何事にも偏見を持たないようにしている。だから心情的には信じ難いような情報でもそれが正しいことでありそうなら、積極的に受け入れるようにしている。

ブルース・コフナー

Q　あなたは世界で最も成功しているトレーダーですが、そのような成功を収めている人はあまりいません。どこが普通のトレーダーと違うのだと思いますか？2つの大切な要素が必要だと思う。1つは、今日とは全く異なった世界のことについて想像できる能力とそれが現実的にあり得ると考えられる能力だ。例えば、大豆の値段が倍になるとか、ドルが100円まで下落するとかいったことだよ。そして、プレッシャーの中にあっても常に理性を保ち平静を装える能力、これが二つ目だよ。

エド・スィコータ

負けるトレーダーが勝てるトレーダーに変身できることはほとんどない。負けるトレーダーは彼自身を変えたいと思ってはいない。それは勝てるトレーダーがやることなんだ。

タートルズ

You know, I don't do things blindly.

I don't like to. I never did. Even as a kid I had to know why I should do certain things. But this time I had no definite reason to give to myself, and yet I was so uncomfortable that I couldn't stand it. I called to a fellow I knew, Dave Wyman, and said to him "Dave, you take my place here. I want you to do something for me. Wait a little before you call out the next price of Sugar, will you?"

Then all of a sudden I didn't like the way Sugar was doing its hesitating.

 I began to feel uncomfortable. I thought I ought to get out of the market. Then it sold at 103 — that was low for the day — but instead of feeling more confident I felt more uncertain. I knew something was wrong somewhere, but I couldn't spot it exactly. But if something was coming and I didn't know where from, I couldn't be on my guard against it. That being the case I'd better be out of the market.

I had put out my 3500 shares of Sugar at 105 1/4.

There was another fellow in the room, Henry Williams, who was short 2500 shares. I used to sit by the ticker and call out the quotations for the board boy. The price behaved as I thought it would. It promptly went down a couple of points and paused a little to get its breath before taking another dip. The general market was pretty soft and everything looked promising.

Well, this day I remember I had up over $10,000 in margins.

I was only twenty when I first accumulated ten thousand dollars in cash. And you ought to have heard my mother. You'd have thought that ten thousand dollars in cash was more than anybody carried around except old John D. [Rockefeller], and she used to tell me to be satisfied and go into some regular business. I had a hard time convincing her that I was not gambling, but making money by figuring. But all she could see was that ten thousand dollars was a lot of money and all I could see was more margin.

Well, on the day the thing happened that I am going to tell you,

 I was short thirty-five hundred shares of Sugar. I had seven big pink tickets for five hundred shares each. The Cosmopolitan used big slips with a blank space on them where they could write down additional margin. Of course, the bucket shops never ask for more margin. The thinner the shoestring the better for them, for their profit lies in your being wiped. In the smaller shops if you wanted to margin your trade still further they'd make out a new ticket, so they could charge you the buying commission and only give you a run of 3/4 of a point on each point's decline, for they figured the selling commission also exactly as if it were a new trade.

But the Cosmopolitan was the finest in New England.

 It had thousands of patrons and I really think I was the only man they were afraid of. Neither the killing premium nor the three-point margin they made me put up reduced my trading much. I kept on buying and selling as much as they'd let me. I sometimes had a line of 5000 shares.

In the humbler bucket shops, where people were allowed to trade in as little as five shares,

 the tickets were little slips  different colors for buying and selling  and at times, as for instance in boiling bull markets, the shops would be hard hit because all the customers were bulls and happened to be right. Then the bucket shop would deduct both buying and selling commissions and if you bought a stock at 20 the ticket would read 20 1/4. You thus had only 3/4 of a point's run for your money.

When you wished to close your trade you went to the clerk

 the same or another, it depended on the shop   and you told him. He took the last price or if the stock had not been active he waited for the next quotation that came out on the tape. He wrote that price and the time on your ticket, O.K.'d it and gave it back to you, and then you went to the cashier and got whatever cash it called for. Of course, when the market went against you and the price went beyond the limit set by your margin, your trade automatically closed itself and your ticket became one more scrap of paper.

You know how they traded in bucket shops.

 You gave your money to a clerk and told him what you wished to buy or sell. He looked at the tape or the quotation board and took the price from there — the last one, of course. He also put down the time on the ticket so that it almost read like a regular broker's report — that is, that they had bought or sold for you so many shares of such a stock at such a price at such a time on such a day and how much money they received from you.

The Cosmopolitan, as I said, was my last resort.

It was the richest bucket shop in New England, and as a rule they put no limit on a trade. I think I was the heaviest individual trader they had — that is, of the steady, everyday customers. They had a fine office and the largest and completest quotation board I have ever seen anywhere. It ran along the whole length of the big room and every imaginable thing was quoted. I mean stocks dealt in on the New York and Boston Stock Exchanges, cotton, wheat, provisions, metals — everything that was bought and sold in New York, Chicago, Boston and Liverpool.

hunch

2 …を押す, 押しやる, 突く provision食糧

フェイスがストップ高、第３四半期の大幅増益と高進ちょく率

　コンテンツ配信や電子マネー事業を展開するフェイス <4295> がストップ高。１４日引け後に今０８年３月期の第３四半期業績（０７年４月～１２月累計）を発表。連結経常利益は１４億７９００万円（前年同期比６３．７％増）と大幅な増益だった。最終損益も１３億６００万円の黒字に転換（前年同期実績は３７億８５００万円の赤字）。コンテンツ事業は低調だったものの、電子マネー事業がオンラインゲーム・音楽配信・映像配信などでの需要の拡大傾向を背景に、大きく伸長した。　通期計画に対する業績の進ちょく率は、経常ベースでは８７％に達しており、純利益ベースでは既に予想を上回っている。ただ、会社側では通期計画を修正しておらず、業績予想の上方修正期待が一段と高まってきた。調整が続いていた株価は底打ち感が鮮明となった。

トレーダー効果

パフォーマンスの優秀な手法でも、広まることで、機能しなくなる。同じ手法をみんながやってしまうと、相場の動きは、まったく変わってしまう。また、画一的な方法でトレードは、食い物にされやすい。シグナルの先回りをされるし、ロスカットも先回りされる。

少数の法則

小さなあるいは偏った例をもとに、全体の判断を行うこと。統計的に判断するなら、母集団を代表する十分な数のサンプルを用いるべき。

係留(アンカリング)

簡単に手に入る情報に頼りすぎる傾向、またそれに縛られること。例えば、株価が高いとか安いとかは、ちょっと前の株価を元に判断される。また、みんながやってるからという理由で同じ意見を持つ「バンドワゴン効果」というのもある。

直近偏向

人は最近の結果に影響を受けやすい。直近１、２回の成功、失敗でなく、長い目で見て判断するのが大事。

結果偏向

プロセスよりも、結果を重視しすぎる傾向。もちろん結果が大事だが、結果を出すのはプロセスなので、プロセスを重視すべき。偶然で悪い結果が続いても、プロセスが正しいと信じるなら、オタオタしない。

Of course I had my ups and downs,

but was a winner on balance. However, the Cosmopolitan people were not satisfied with the awful handicap they had tacked on me, which should have been enough to beat anybody. They tried to double cross me. They didn't get me. I escaped because of one of my hunches. The Cosmopolitan, as I said, was my last resort. It was the richest bucket shop in New England, and as a rule they put no limit on a trade. I think I was the heaviest individual trader they had ; that is, of the steady, everyday customers. They had a fine office and the largest and completest quotation board I have ever seen anywhere. It ran along the whole length of the big room and every imaginable thing was quoted. I mean stocks dealt in on the New York and Boston Stock Exchanges, cotton, wheat, provisions, metals ; everything that was bought and sold in New York, Chicago, Boston and Liverpool.

But when the Cosmopolitan tacked on that premium

they were hitting below the belt. It meant that if the price was 90 when I bought, instead of making my ticket: "Bot Steel at 90 1/8," it read: "Bot Steel at 91 1/8." Why, that stock could advance a point and a quarter after I bought it and I'd still be losing money if I closed the trade. And by also insisting that I put up a three-point margin at the very start they reduced my trading capacity by two-thirds. Still, that was the only bucket shop that would take my business at all, and I had to accept their terms or quit trading.

that is, they made me put up a three-point margin

and compelled me to pay a premium at first of a half point, then a point, and finally, a point and a half. Some handicap, that! How? Easy! Suppose Steel was selling at 90 and you bought it. Your ticket read, normally: "Bot ten Steel at 90 1/8." If you put up a point margin it meant that if it broke 89 1/4 you were wiped out automatically. In a bucket shop the customer is not importuned for more margin or put to the painful necessity of telling his broker to sell for anything he can get.

Finally there was only one left to me and that was the biggest and richest of all &#8212; the Cosmopolitan Stock Brokerage Company.

The Cosmopolitan was rated as A-1 and did an enormous business. It had branches in every manufacturing town in New England. They took my trading all right, and I bought and sold stocks and made and lost money for months, but in the end it happened with them as usual. They didn't refuse my business point-blank, as the small concerns had. Oh, not because it wasn't sportsmanship, but because they knew it would give them a black eye to publish the news that they wouldn't take a fellow's business just because that fellow happened to make a little money. But they did the next worse thing

"What did they say to you?" I asked him politely.

"They said, 'You blankety-blank fool, didn't we tell you to take no business from Larry Livingston? And you deliberately let him trim us out of $700!' " He didn't say what else they told him. I tried the other branches one after another, but they all got to know me, and my money wasn't any good in any of their offices. I couldn't even go in to look at the quotations without some of the clerks making cracks at me. I tried to get them to let me trade at long intervals by dividing my visits among them all. But that didn't work.

sand

sand

Once, when the big concern I'd been trading with for months shut down on me I made up my mind to take a little more of their money away from them.

That bucket shop had branches all over the city, in hotel lobbies, and in nearby towns. I went to one of the hotel branches and asked the manager a few questions and finally got to trading. But as soon as I played an active stock my especial way he began to get messages from the head office asking who it was that was operating. The manager told me what they asked him and I told him my name was Edward Robinson, of Cambridge. He telephoned the glad news to the big chief. But the other end wanted to know what I looked like. When the manager told me that I said to him, "Tell him I am a short fat man with dark hair and a bushy beard!" But he described me instead, and then he listened and his face got red and he hung up and told me to beat it.

ラリー・ハイト氏

トレンド・フォロー戦略 いかなるトレードでも総資産の一定比率以上のリスクをとらないこと。トレンドを追いかけることと、その手法を堅く守ること。リスクを減らすためにマーケットを分散させること。ボラティリティに注意を払うこと。

20リンチ

20リンチ

Richard J. Dennis,

a former commodities speculator known as the "Prince of the Pit,"[1] was born in Chicago, in January, 1949. In the early 1970s, he borrowed several thousand dollars and reportedly made $200 million in about ten years. He incurred significant losses in the stock market crash of 1987, and retired from trading for several years.[2] He has been active in Democratic and Libertarian political causes, most notably in campaigns against drug prohibition.[3]

Jim Rogers

He is not a technical trader but importance of COMPOUNDING at the top of his list. Compounding is the magic of investing, you can not get rich over night, but with compounding you at least have a chance.

may our paths cross again some day.

If people asked me what my goal was, I would answer:"To make the world a better place, of course." I think the power lies in all of us to make the world better in some concrete way, however small. That is a worthy objective. I would be far richer and more "successful" if I had stuck to trading and never ventured into anything new. Some of the other Turtles did that and have been wildly successful running hedge funds with hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars under management. Similarly, if I had stuck with a particular niche in the software industry, I might be more successful, at least as others measure success.True to my nature, I don't care about other's opinions of my success. They are not going to be the ones at my deathbed wondering whether I made a difference, whether I lived well and fully. I am." To Richard Denis, who made it all possible, and to Juliet Mantiply, my first muse; may our paths cross again some day."

処理効果

利益は早く確定しようとし、損失はできるだけ長くのばそうとすること。上の２つと同じことか？