As we have discussed in class, for many Asian peoples except the Japanese, World War II was fundamentally a forerunner to their wars for independence. So the end of World War II meant liberation from oppressors. In Japan, according to Fumito Kanda, immediately after the war 37,000 Koreans and 3,000 Chinese who had been forced to work mainly as mine workers in Hokkaido rose up for liberation, starting riots. The riots lasted from August to November, 1945, until finally the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ SCAP) intervened.
In French Indochina, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia revolted against France. These anti-French nationalist movements soon expanded into the First Indochina War in 1946. In China, the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party, which rekindled immediately after the end of World War II, was also closely related to such independence movements.
Anti-colonialism spread from Northeast Asia to the Middle East. Ironically, it was Japan’s occupation during the war that awoke feelings of nationalism among the Asian people. In consequence, independent states appeared one by one in Asia after the end of the war.
(解説) 「独立運動の夜明け」についての筆者の見解を示したものだ。アジアには、ヨーロッパ列強の支配に対する反感と日本の支配に対する反感という2つの流れがあった。 「ヨーロッパの列強による植民地支配を打破しようという運動」はthe movements to destroy the structure of European dominated colonial empiresとしたが、こうした回りくどい表現はあまり好まれないようで、添削では簡単にanti-colonialismと直された。確かにこのほうが、はるかにすっきりする。
The Chinese Civil War In 1945, as soon as Japan surrendered, fighting broke out between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party. Despite American efforts at mediation, hostilities continued, and the conflict soon led to full-scale civil war. By the end of 1948, the Communists had taken the offensive, finally winning the war and driving the Nationalist Party off the mainland.
In a sense, the communist victory in the Chinese civil war was the beginning of a series of nationalistic victories in East Asia. This was definitely related to the wider liberation movement because, as Professor Miller explained in class, Mao Zedong succeeded in “harnessing peasant nationalism” to win the war. Calling the war “the great War of Liberation,” he “spoke for Chinese nationalism—especially peasant nationalism—which was aroused by the Japanese invasion and occupation” in the 1930s and 1940s, and he made every effort to make Chinese communists “the legitimate spokesman for Chinese nationalism.”
On the other hand, the Nationalist Party, led by Chiang Kai-shek, was not able to win the hearts of the civilian populace. It suffered from official corruption, loss of morale in the armed forces, and economic collapse. In contrast to the communist land reform policy to save the Chinese peasants, Chiang’s inflationary policy paralyzed the economy. It was only natural that Chiang, who had not vigorously fought the Japanese during the 1930s, failed to be seen as representing Chinese nationalism.
The US did not fully realize which side appealed more to the Chinese people. In other words, the US failed to perceive the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy as standard-bearer for Chinese nationalism. This was the first American failure in its foreign policy toward Asia. The US did not correctly perceive the independence movements spreading across Asia. By contrast, Mao’s strategy was a great success. He initially aroused Chinese nationalism by targeting the Japanese invasion and occupation and later by taking advantage of Chiang’s failure in economic policy and the American ignorance of Asian popular feelings and Asian nationalism. This nationalistic strategy was particularly evident in the Korean War.
The Korean War The Korean independence movement had emerged as early as the March First Movement in 1919, but Japan, which had been dominating Korea since the Protectorate Treaty in 1905, severely suppressed nationalist movements in the following years until its defeat in World War II. Unfortunately, shortly before the end of World War II, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to divide the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel despite Korean hopes to avoid such a fate.
This division greatly affected the nationalistic movement on the Korean peninsula because, while in the south right-wing nationalists attacked a well-developed leftist movement, in the north the Soviet Union suppressed moderate nationalists. Nobody was able to bring these different independence movements together. By 1947, both the US and the Soviet Union began arranging separate governments. The Republic of Korea was born in August 1948, supported by the US; the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was established in September 1948, supported by the Soviet Union.
However, this north-south separation was not at all a good situation for Korean nationalism. It made the issue more complicated. Which was the legitimate leader of Korean nationalism? Kim Il-sung would definitely have said that it was the north. And to prove his Korean nationalism, North Korean troops attacked across the 38th parallel in 1950, starting the Korean War.
China’s initial feelings about the war were mixed. It was tempted to intervene for the sake of its self-defense. But if it entered the war, Mao feared, the US might also. Mao did not want a war with the US. However, he finally decided to enter the war because he believed that his strategy to push Chinese revolutionary nationalism was far more important than the risk he took by entering the war.
As Jian Chen emphasizes in his book China’s Road to the Korean War, China’s decision to enter the Korean War was “based on the belief that the outcome of the Korean crisis was closely related to the new China’s vital domestic and international interests.” Mao made use of the war as a leverage to advance his revolutionary nationalism, to push forward “ [his]
perceived revolutionary transformation of Chinese society,” and to “signal revolutionary China’s reemergence as a prominent world power” or to revitalize China.
China’s intervention in the war significantly changed the situation. When a unified United Nations forces commanded by the American Commander-in-Chief in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur, fought back against North Korea, crossed the 38th parallel, and threatened China with units reaching the Yalu in October 1950, the Chinese struck back, helping North Korea and forcing the UN forces to retreat back to South Korea. The war seesawed back and forth after the Chinese involvement, but ultimately China proved that Asia could beat the West.
Mao’s decision was right from the viewpoint of advancing his revolutionary nationalism. For the first time in its modern history, China had not given in to Western powers. Moreover, through participation in the war, Mao eliminated reactionary resistance to his new regime, educated his people to strike against the arrogance of US imperialist aggression, and succeeded in creating a revolutionary momentum in the Chinese people. And, more than anything else, Mao was able to enhance the image of China as a leader in the revolutionary struggle against Western domination in Asia and Africa.
This is why Mao and the Beijing leaders called China’s involvement in the Korean War a great victory. Ironically, because of this confidence, later Mao would proceed with cruel experiments such as the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.