真秀　まほろばへ

真珠湾へ向かう南雲艦隊を誘ったルーズベルト・ホワイトハウス内部

​　大部分の文明国の大部分の（厳しい階級の中に生きる）軍人は愛国者であり、文民政治家達の命令には従うようだ。しかし、文民政治家達の中にいる真の愛国者というものはあまり多くはいないように、戦後に生まれた当ブロガーには感じられる（日本だけでなく）。愛国などというものは幻想に過ぎないのかもとも時々思わされる・・・。もっとも、皆にお会いしたわけもなく、聞いたり読んだりしたうえでの認識ではありますが・・・。　パール・ハーバー　Pearl Harbor 77年前の今日だったそうです。私は生まれてもいなかったため、聞いたり読んだりしたことでしかわからないのですが・・・。　記念日でもありますから、あまり日本では読まれていなさそうな、でも、迫真の「当時のホワイトハウス Vs　当時のハワイの海軍司令官キンメル将軍」が、キンメル将軍へのインタビューをないまぜて書かれた書がありますので、多少長く感ぜられるか知れませんが、引用してみます。　　日本政府から、駐米大使への14通の電信を傍受、解読、翻訳、は全てホワイトハウス内へ・・・。　それは「大きな獲物に罠をしかけて、”朗報”をまつ狩人達、各所配置のセンサーから聞こえる足音を耳にして、ドキドキしながら、押し黙ってまっている狩人達の姿」　アメリカ対日本という構図はちょっと当てはまらないのでは、少なくとも疑ってみた方が、真実に近づけるのかも・・・　米の支配者たちと、日本の支配者たちの一部が、○タマを握り合って、戦場で血を流させられるのは、両国とも、被支配の層の人達であることは、間違いないでしょう・・・あなたの家族、じいちゃんばあちゃんのもう一世代上以上の人達は駆り出されているはずですね。西郷・山県のつくった徴兵制でです。そもそも戸籍なんてのは江戸時代にはなかったというではないか、徴兵を的確に実施するために戸籍法とセットでできあがったそうな・・・。　スイスのBIS(Bank of International Settlement：国際決済銀行）には、日本からも横浜正金銀行（為替銀行）から3人ほど出向、ナチドイツからも、英米仏は勿論のこと、石油や金や鉄鉱石、硝石、タングステン、レアメタル、ゴム・・・戦争遂行には総合産業生産能力が要り、資源もまた膨大なものが必要である。日本は何処から誰から何を買い、何で決済していたのか・・・とにかく、BIS本部で敵対各国の銀行員達が机を並べて、決済業務をやっていたことは、事実だと、本で読みました。　ハルノート発出前から択捉島の基地から、南雲艦隊は静かに発進したのではなかったか・・・東京裁判で海軍大将の皆さんは一人もA級にノミネートされなかったそうで、なぜなの？・・・　真珠湾の基地の石油タンクや修理工場を爆撃しないで、無傷で残してあげたのは、いったいどこからの命令にしたがったからなの？・・・　戦時、英米独西日を股にかけた大物スパイ、ベラスコが引退後来日し、友？高橋五郎氏に、山本五十六の墓に参りたいと申し出たのはいったい何？・・・ ​＊注）　著者 Curtis B. Dall　は、F.D.Roosevelt大統領　の娘婿だった人​。ウオール街の投資実業家から戦後政治家に、1960年ー64年、愛国的な「憲法党」を立ち上げ党首に。（民主党・共和党共に、その上部が巧みにCFR等の国際主義者の手のひらで踊らされていることに気づき、第3党として立ち上げた） 　　　　　　　”FDR: My Exploited Father-in-Law ” （FDR : 搾取・利用された我が義父） C 1968 by Curtis B. Dall   CHAPTER 21 My Visit with Admiral海軍大将 Kimmel      (Author's note: It was my pleasure, during the final phases of editing this book, to be afforded a personal, exclusive interview with Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, whose ill fortune it was to fall heir後継者, completely unfairly, to partial blame for the disaster at Pearl Harbor. So pertinent関連する were his remarks during our conversation to the intent of this book, that we add them here to point even more clearly to the perfidy不信［裏切り］行為 foisted押しつけるupon the American people in these dark days of America's history.)   ​    Admiral Kimmel, more than any other Naval officer certainly knows the "score傷跡" about "Pearl Harbor" and can now state the truth.  ​ （中略）　     Accordingly, on December 16, 1966, I wrote the Admiral, introduced myself, and suggested a meeting at his home at a mutually convenient time to discuss matters of mutual interest, including Pearl Harbor. ​   In due course I received a cordial reply from him saying that he had been submerged埋もれる under a flood of about six hundred letters received since the 25th anniversary of Pearl Harbor Day. He set a date for our meeting on February 3, 1967. ​     ​On that day, I journeyed from Philadelphia to see him in Groton, Connecticut, with much anticipation期待, for what turned out to be a memorable afternoon. ​ （中略） ​Continuing, the Admiral said, "Colonel Dall, interestingly enough, or perhaps significantly enough, I had not been long in that Command when an order came through from Washington for me ​​to transfer移動させる ​​ several capital主要な ships and some auxiliaries補助艦, including oilers給油艦, for duty in other areas, which reduced my strength about 20% .​​ Then, several months later, in June of 1941, ​as I recall it, I was ordered to detach分離する and transfer移動させる ​​more capital主要な ships.​ Becoming most disturbed by this time, I went to Washington and protested that order coming from Admiral Stark. I did manage to have the order somewhat modified by him, but I was further weakened--something which puzzled me no end." ​ I remarked, "Admiral, on that June trip, did you try to see FDR?"     "Yes," was the reply. "I tried, but Roosevelt did not wish to see me." ​    At my indicated look of surprise, the Admiral continued, （キンメル将軍は続けた）"To cap it all, in the late Fall of 1941, not very long before the attack occurred, the Navy Department in Washington ordered my three carriers detached, sending one to Wake, one to Midway and one back to home waters.（「さらにひどいことには、攻撃が起こる少し前、1941年の秋も終わり頃に、ワシントンの海軍省は、私の３隻の空母を引き離し、一隻はｳｴｰｸへ、一隻はミッドウエイへ、そして一隻は本拠港へ返すよう命令してきたのです。」） 　So, on December 7, 1941, my fleet was deprived of carrier air strength.（だから、1941年12月7日の日には 、私の艦隊は艦載航空機を奪われてしまっていたのです）　General Short had about 12 Army reconnaissance planes（偵察機）, of which only six were in operational condition for extended reconnaissance over water!" ​     The Admiral then arose and walked slowly about the room to stretch his legs, and continued his startling remarks.     "Colonel Dall, this may further surprise you, ​​​but I found out later that the Japanese Task Force approaching Pearl Harbor, had specific orders that if the American Forces at Pearl Harbor became alerted, before the attack was launched, their Task Force was to return, at once, to Japanese waters, without attacking! 　（「ﾄﾞｰﾙ大佐、このことはもっと君を驚かすだろうよ。私は後に知ったのだが、真珠湾に向かっていた日本の艦隊は、攻撃前に敵に察知された場合は、中止し、速やかに日本海域に帰ることとする明確な命令を抱えていたのだ」）　Hence, to me this explained why much vitally important information contained in the decoded解読する and translated翻訳する Japanese cables received in Washington was deliberately故意に withheld from the U. S. Commanders at Hawaii, lest the Japs alter their plans​​​（ｼﾞｬｯﾌﾟ達が彼らの計画を変更しないように） ​to attack under the favorable conditions duly十分に,適切に created for them by Washington."　（「この事実をして、​​​私にその訳が解った、​ワシントンで受信され解読・翻訳された日本の電信がもつ極めて重要な情報が、なぜハワイの米軍の司令官に故意に知らされなかったのか。ﾜｼﾝﾄﾝ政府によって日本の攻撃のために十分なお膳立てをしてやり、ｼﾞｬｯﾌﾟが攻撃計画を変更しないようにしたわけだ。」）​     Here, the Admiral quoted from a secret dispatch〈急信を〉発送するsent from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D. C. on December 1, 1941 . . . "to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious, we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information. )"                                      "I never received this information," said Admiral Kimmel, adding, "Early on Saturday afternoon, December 6, 1941, a pilot message from Tokyo to their Washington Embassy was intercepted傍受するand decoded解読する, indicating that a very important fourteen point message was then on its way to their Ambassador in Washington.     "By three o'clock that afternoon, December 6, 1941, thirteen of the fourteen points had been received, decoded by us and translated. Distribution was promptly made to the most important officers of government by midnight.     "When the thirteen points were delivered to the President in the White House about 9:00 P.M. (3:30 in the afternoon of Saturday in Hawaii), he remarked, 'This means war.'"     Why was a radio message, via the excellent facilities of the Navy, to Admiral Kimmel and General Short--alerting them to their imminent差し迫ったdanger, not promptly dispatched by the Commander-in-Chief最高指令官of our Armed Forces, or by Admiral Stark, acting under his direction? That question is what hurts so badly to contemplate熟考する! Why?     　　A prime responsibility of any officer is to look after the lives and health of the men serving under him, as a matter of simple duty. It represents that faith that exists between loyal, fighting men. Even though FDR had great political pressures placed upon him from the top One-Worlders and their friends in the great banking rooms of One-World money, both here and abroad, to involve us in war, and even though FDR had never put in any significant "time," as a soldier, on the drill-fields軍事教練, in the training camps and battle areas. I could not imagine for a long time why that radio alert to Admiral Kimmel and General Short was not promptly sent by the President! Two days later, however, came FDR's resounding顕著なmessage, expertly delivered to a shocked but hoodwinkedだます, ごまかすCongress, solemnly厳粛に assembled召集する. More important by farはるかにwould have been Saturday's timely warning dispatched to Admiral Kimmel!     I recall the oft-quotedしばしば引用されるwords, "a date which will live in infamy不名誉,  汚名." Certainly that was no understatement控えめな表現on his part. The " infamy" was manifestly明白にpresent, in several areas, but just where lay the heart of it? It lay far away from the bombs that rained down upon thousands of unsuspecting疑わない, loyal Americans at Pearl Harbor.     Admiral Kimmel said to me, "Early the next day, the Sunday morning of December 7th, General Marshall and Admiral Stark met in the latter's office in the Navy Department. About 9:00 a.m., the 14th part of the Japanese message had just been intercepted, decoded and translated.  The time was still only 3 : 3 O a.m. at Pearl Harbor--plenty of time for the alert.     "General Marshall was millingうろうろするaround in Stark's office, pretending he had not fully digested押しつけるthe thirteen parts received on Saturday afternoon. As for his horseback ride for most of Sunday morning in Virginia, so extensively publicized宣伝する, that was a pure fabrication作りごと.     "Stark said to Marshall, 'Let's radio無線で連絡するKimmel, and alert him.' Marshall replied, 'Let's not. It might be detected by the Japs, and complicate things.'" (Emphasis supplied.)     "Stark--'I can reach him by Naval radio, in about 15 minutes.' 　　（ｽﾀｰｸ――  「私なら海軍の無線で彼（ｷﾝﾒﾙ）に知らせれる、15分以内に」）     "Marshall ― 'I'll wire him later.'"  （ﾏｰｼｬﾙ――「私が後で電報を打っておこう」）     "And he finally did Just that," exclaimed強い語調で言うthe Admiral, "Marshall sent me a regular commercial wire, via Western Union, indicating no urgency, or priority of treatment!" （ｷﾝﾒﾙ将軍は強い口調で言った「最終的に彼はその通りにしたのだ。」「ﾏｰｼｬﾙは通常の商業電報を私に送ってよこしたのだ、ｳｴｽﾀﾝ・ﾕﾆｵﾝ社経由でね、しかも緊急扱いでもなければ優先取扱いにもなってないやつでね」     Concluding the episode, the retired Commandant said, "Two hours approximately, after the bombs had fallen, I did receive Marshall's wire, via Western Union, and I was so damned mad to get a regular Western Union commercial wire then from him, that after reading it, I crumpledくしゃくしゃにするit up and threw it in the waste basket屑篭! Admiral Stark, however, had gotten his message through to Admiral Bloch, shortly before that, trying to find out just what had happened. Bloch was then Commander of the local Naval station at Pearl."     How often have I conjectured推量する about what transpired起こる in the White House shortly after the Jap bombs exploded, when the awesome details about the Pearl Harbor holocaust had been received by FDR and other high officials in Washington?     It is reported that Francis Biddle, the Attorney General司法長官, recalls observing観察するFDR at the time, who appeared to be stunned（驚き・うれしさなどで）ぼうっとさせる, aloofよそよそしいand silent. To me, such a reaction on his part was not a bit surprising, in view of the enormity大罪of his mistakes, or his failure to alert and warn Admiral Kimmel on the previous evening, about the imminent差し迫ったdanger! (Ref: Newsweek, December 12, 1966, Page 42.)       Admiral Kimmel then asked me if I would join him in a cup of coffee, and our conversation gradually drifted into a new area.     I said, "Admiral, what happened next, after the Jap Task Force departed?"     He replied, "After a few days, Justice Owen Roberts arrived with a Commission from Washington, appointed by President Roosevelt, to investigate the situation, in effect however, to come up with(を見つける)the much needed 'scapegoats,' meaning, of course, General Short and myself, so that the eyes of the outraged〈人・世論などを〉憤慨させるAmerican people could be duly directed and focused upon individuals in Hawaii, not on policy in Washington in attempted explanation of the great tragedy.     "In ten days after the attack, I was relieved of my Command and in thirty days, retired.     "Roberts proceeded, at once, to conduct his hearings in a most high-handed高圧的なmanner, brandishing振り回すthe legal hatchet手おのlike a Crusader十字軍戦士.      "As for me, the chief target, I was not allowed any legal advice; was not allowed to know as to what numerous others had testified. Although the stenographic速記のrecording facilities on the island were admittedly faulty and inadequate for such a proceeding, I was not allowed by Roberts to review and correct my testimony, when completed, even in the fact of some recorded downright露骨なdistortionsゆがみand falsification歪曲of the truth!     "Finally, I protested and we had a very stormy meeting about it. No doubt Roberts had a certain, specific mission to perform, for the Washington pundits権威者達, hence he was really all set and determined to return there with the desired results. In my books, he was an arrogant傲慢な . . .!     "The theory of the extensive inter-service rivalry, so eagerly seized upon by the press, was soon hatched. Apparently, General Short and myself were not even on speaking terms. That fabrication was as absurd as it was false! We were friends and duly consulted on all matters of importance."     The Admiral then called to my attention a long letter that he had addressed to the Hon. Clarence Cannon, Congressman from Missouri, House Office Building, Washington, D. C., dated June 3, 1958, protesting the accuracy of numerous remarks the Congressman had felt called upon to make on the floor of the House about Pearl Harbor, on May 6, I 958. His remarks were included in the Congressional Record on that date. Quoting Kimmel: "From your remarks I have learned for the first time the origin of the lie that General Short and I were not on speaking terms at the time of the attack. I would like very much to know the identity of the individual who gave you this testimony before a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. In regard to the alleged lack of cooperation between General Short and me, your statement is completely in error. The Naval Court of Inquiry found that, 'Admiral Kimmel and Lieut. General Short were personal friends. They met frequently, both socially and officially.'"  (Finding of Fact Number 5 )     Quoting again from the second Cannon letter, both un-                              answered, "I repeat to you once more, Mr. Cannon, the success of the attack on Pearl Harbor was not the result of intra-service内部の rivalries at Pearl Harbor. This success was caused by the deliberate failure of Washington to give the Commanders in Hawaii the information available in Washington to which they were entitled権利［資格］を与える. This information which was denied to the Hawaiian Commanders was supplied to the American Commanders in the Philippines and to the British." (Emphasis. mine ) .     'The Roberts Report was a shambles," the Admiral added. "full of glaring目を怒らして〈憎悪・反抗の意などを〉表わすinaccuracies to serve the purpose--to make me the 'Goat,' with General Short, to attempt to avoid the expected impact of Hull's November 26, 1941, 'ultimatum最後通牒' to the Japs and the studied enticements誘惑するものextended to them to attack us, at Pearl Harbor, under circumstances presenting small risks."       "Admiral," I said, "the Japanese Consul in Honolulu had been supplying Tokyo with the most minute information as to what ships were located where in the Pearl Harbor area, hence, is it not true they knew early in December, 1941, that our Naval air strength on the carriers was clearly something in absentia不在,留守?"     "Of course," was his reply, adding, "I read the decoded and translated messages we intercepted傍受するon December 5th and December 6th, 1941, later on, covering that particular point, of course, of course! That information was not made available to me at the time."     I remarked that I had made a brief comparison between the Roberts Report on Pearl Harbor（ﾊﾟｰﾙ･ﾊｰﾊﾞｰのﾛﾊﾞｰﾄ報告書） and the Warren Report on the assassination of President Kennedy（ｹﾈﾃﾞｲ大統領暗殺のｳｵｰﾚﾝ報告書） in my nearly completed book; indicating that it appeared to me a further investigation of the latter tragic incident should be implemented by Congress without delay to develop the whole truth. I also read to him several pages, which he listened to with much interest, indicating his approval.    引用、以下略。​　以上。